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I. INTRODUCTION: CONTRACT'S EMPIRE IN ARBITRATION

A universal principle of contemporary arbitration law is that
contract plays a vital role in the governance of arbitration.' The

* Samuel P. Orlando Distinguished Professor of Law, Penn State
The Dickinson
School of Law.
1.
The U.S. Supreme Court has explained:
We have previously held that the FAA's pro-arbitration policy does not operate
without regard to the wishes of the contracting parties ....
[I]f contracting
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vitality of that role can vary by legal system, court, statute, or

treaty. 2 Nonetheless, party agreement

often provides the most

parties agree . .. , the FAA ensures that their agreement will be enforced
according to its terms even if a rule of state law would otherwise exclude such
claims from arbitration.
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57-58 (1995). And even
earlier:
There is no federal policy favoring arbitration under a certain set of procedural
rules; the federal policy is simply to ensure the enforceability, according to
their terms, of private agreements to arbitrate . .. (Tihe FAA does not require
parties to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so ... nor does it prevent
parties who do agree to arbitrate from excluding certain claims from the scope
of their arbitration agreement. It simply requires courts to enforce privately
negotiated agreements to arbitrate, like other contracts, in accordance with
their terms.
Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476-78
(1989).
2.
In terms of legal systems, it is clear that different systems have contrasting
assessments of the role of contract in the regulation of arbitration. For example,
despite its prominence in the international marketplace, Japan has never been an
enthusiastic proponent of international commercial arbitration. The current Japanese
law on arbitration is borrowed from nineteenth-century German law, and efforts to
modernize it have been stymied for decades. The strong Japanese cultural preference
for mediation and the determination of disputes through social hierarchies even affects
the manner in which transborder and maritime arbitrations are conducted in Japan.
Arbitral proceedings resemble mediation sessions in their length and in the number of
meetings. See generally Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975);
THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF
ARBITRATION 1187 (3d ed. 2002). The enactment of a new Japanese law on arbitration,
which has been in draft form since 1989, was passed by the Diet on July 25, 2003. It
becomes effective in May 2004. See JAPAN SHIPPING AND EXcHANGE BULL. Mar. 2003,
at 1 and Aug. 2003, at 1.
The U.S. Supreme Court doctrine on arbitration represents the most absolute
statement of the vigor of contract freedom in arbitration. See Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd.
of Tr. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 496 (1989); accord Mastrobuono v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995) (appearing to hold that party
provisions will be followed and implemented as long as they validate the initial
reference to arbitrate). Justice Thomas is absolutely correct when he underscores the
inconsistency between the holding in these two cases in his dissent in Mastrobuono.
Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 67. The inconsistency, however, has not disturbed the
direction of the evolving doctrine; in fact, it was largely ignored and is now essentially
forgotten. Volt and Mastrobuono are seen as expressing the same support for the role of
contract freedom in arbitration.
The French law on arbitration is a sophisticated statement of legal policy and rules
on arbitration. In its day (circa 1980), it represented the most liberal statutory
framework on arbitration. The legal system and the rules of law did not function as
obstacles to the reference to arbitration or to the enforcement of arbitral awards. See
generally JEAN ROBERT, L'ARBITRAGE-DROIT INTERNE, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE
(6th ed. 1993); see also Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Elaboration of a French Court
Doctrine on InternationalCommercial Arbitration:A Study in Liberal Civilian Judicial
Creativity, 55 TUL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1980); Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Reform of the
French Procedural Law on Arbitration: An Analytical Commentary on the Decree of
May 14, 1980, 4 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 273, 275 (1981). The play of contract
freedom, even in such a favorable regime to arbitration, is far from absolute, however.
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significant rules for regulating arbitrations and conducting arbitral
proceedings. 3 This is especially true in international commercial
arbitration. There, the lack of a functional transborder legislative and
adjudicatory process made contract the principal source of law for
international commercial transactions and arbitrations. Although
law-making is more possible within individual national legal systems,
the rule of contract freedom is also firmly established in matters of
domestic arbitration. 4 Within legal systems, contract's empire is

For example, the French law on arbitration still gives meaningful recognition to the
subject-matter inarbitrability defense-bankruptcy disputes are not arbitrable because
they implicate the rights of nonarbitrating third-parties-and establishes mandatory
rules of arbitral procedure, such as that awards must be rendered with reasons.
N.C.P.C. art. 1471. The regulation of arbitration in the name of the public interest still
takes place in France. In a recent case, the French Court of Cassation held that a
contract provision permitting the arbitrators to extend the statutory time limit for
rendering the award was not enforceable. To modify the statutory time limit rules,
either the arbitrators or the parties had to file an action before a court of law. See
Busquet v. Peyre, Cass. 2e civ., Nov. 7, 2002. This holding confirms that some aspects
of the statutory law on arbitration cannot be modified by contract. The French rule on
contract freedom, therefore, differs in some significant respects from its counterpart in
U.S. law.
The English statutory law on arbitration, which was enacted in June 1996, also
makes its own, unique imprint on the regulation of arbitration. Arbitration Act, 1996,
Commencement No. 1 (Eng.). While the statute incorporates the principle of freedom of
contract and also acknowledges the need for mandatory provisions of law on
arbitration, it represents-in the main-a pragmatic view of the law and practice of
arbitration. It seeks primarily to make arbitration workable and fair in those areas of
activity in which arbitration makes the most sense. The pragmatism and practicality of
the statute is in evidence in its inaugural provision. It states:
General Principles.
1.
The provisions of this Part are founded on the following principles,
and shall be construed accordingly(a) the object of arbitration is to obtain the fair resolution of disputes
by an impartial tribunal without unnecessary delay or expense;
(b) the parties should be free to agree how their disputes are resolved,
subject only to such safeguards as are necessary in the public interest;
(c) in matters governed by this Part the court should not intervene
except as provided by this Part.
Id. For an analysis of the law, see generally BRUCE HARRIS, ROWAN PLANTEROSE &
JONATHAN TECKS, THE ARBITRATION ACT 1996: A COMMENTARY (2d ed. 2000); J.M.
HUNTER & T. LANDAU, THE ENGLISH ARBITRATION ACT 1996: TEXT AND NOTES (1998);

ROBERT MERKIN, THE ARBITRATION ACT 1996 (2d ed. 2000).
CIETAC arbitration represents perhaps the most unstable form of arbitration in
transborder commercial relations. While there have been numerous CIETAC arbitral
proceedings, the numbers recently have declined and there have been complaints about
the independence and impartiality of the tribunals. See CARBONNEAU, CASES AND
MATERIALS, supra, at 1189; see also WANG SHENGCHANG, PracticalAspects of ForeignRelated Arbitration in China, [1997] SWEDISH & INT'L ARB. 45, 47.
3.
See CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 2, at 14-16.
4.
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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founded upon a different rationale: in court doctrine, it serves to
legitimate the privatization of adjudication by underscoring
arbitration's ostensibly voluntary character. 5 Freedom of contract,

5.
The U.S. Supreme Court has not hesitated to enforce contracts of
arbitration that are manifestly unilateral and which provide for some one-sided
advantages. This is true in both the employment and consumer settings. For example,
in the majority opinion in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,
Justice Kennedy barely acknowledged the argument that the contract for arbitration
imposed by the brokerage upon securities investors was unfair under the language of
Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 483 (1989). The latter provides that
arbitration agreements are subject to the ordinary rules of contract formation and the
usual defenses to contract enforcement for reasons of contract invalidity. Federal
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2003). The agreement in Rodriguez, as in many consumer
areas then and since, was drafted by the brokerage and was non-negotiable. Rodriguez,
490 U.S. at 478. No brokerage firm would do business with an investor unless the
latter agreed to arbitrate disputes pursuant to the standard contract. Id. The
agreement to arbitrate, here and elsewhere, was undeniably one-sided and unilateral;
it did not reflect a "meeting of the minds." Justice Kennedy cryptically stated that:
"Although petitioners suggest that the agreement to arbitrate here was adhesive in
nature, the record contains no factual showing sufficient to support that suggestion."
Id. at 484.
Arguments that contract formation problems should invalidate allegedly flawed
arbitration agreements are more likely to succeed in California. This result will obtain
at both the state and federal court levels. The exchange between the U.S. Supreme
Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams illustrates the point. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105
(2001). In Adams, the Court considered the existence and scope of the so-called
employment contract exclusion in Section 1 of the FAA. Id. at 109. The Ninth Circuit
had ruled that the language of FAA Section 1 exempted all employment contracts from
the jurisdiction of the FAA. Id. The Court disagreed and ruled that the employment
contract exclusion only applied to the employment contracts of interstate
transportation workers. Id. Employers, therefore, could require all other employees to
arbitrate workplace disputes. Id. On remand, the Ninth Circuit found that the motion
to compel arbitration should still be rejected, but upon a more doctrinally acceptable
basis. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 896 (9th Cir. 2002). The federal
appellate court, applying California contract law, ruled that Circuit City's arbitration
agreement was an unconscionable contract and, therefore, unenforcable. Id. at 892. In
the court's view, the federal policy favoring arbitration did not prevent the invalidation
of arbitration agreements under the governing state law. Id. Moreover, the California
state contract law on unconscionable contracts did not single out arbitration
agreements for non-enforcement and, therefore, constituted a valid basis for refusing to
enforce an arbitration agreement under the FAA. Id. at 893.
The California Supreme Court also has been active in policing the contractual
validity of arbitration agreements. In the landmark case, Armendariz v. Foundation
Health Psychcare Services, Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 679 (Cal. 2000), the court established
minimal standards of mutuality for the validity of arbitration contracts in the
consumer and other settings. See also Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc., 938
P.2d 903, 924 (Cal. 1997). For an evaluation of the Engalla opinion, see generally
Edward Dauer, Engalla's Legacy to Arbitration: Why Independent Administration Is
Important, 2-3 ADR CURRENTS 1 (1997).
While the prospect of invalidating an arbitration agreement on a contract basis is
strongest in California, courts in other jurisdictions have begun to emulate this stance,
at least to some extent. See, e.g., In re Thicklin v. Fantasy Mobile Homes, Inc., 824 So.
2d 723, 733 (Ala. 2002) (holding that the provision in an arbitral clause prohibiting the
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therefore, is at the very core of how the law regulates arbitration.
What the contracting parties provide in their agreement generally
becomes the controlling law.
Courts can interpose their authority in arbitration. 6 They could
assert their power by policing the formation and the content of
arbitration agreements. But, from a practical standpoint, if courts
were to become more active in the supervision of arbitration, they
would more than likely focus their attention upon awards rather than
agreements. Arbitral awards finalize the results of adjudication and
represent one of the last steps in the process of the coercive
imposition of legal liability. If there were to be a fight between
national interests and the transborder commitment to arbitration, or
if the policy of rights protection were to prevail over the functionality
of adjudication, the contest would take place at the awardenforcement stage of the process. By comparison, arbitration
agreements are more virtual instruments. Agreements have a
symbolic standing: they represent a gateway to private adjudication
and they codify the parties' intent regarding dispute resolution.
Blocking their enforcement would signify opposition to the
fundamental consensus surrounding arbitration rather than the
implementation of a narrower strategy for the periodic defense of
national interests through the vacatur of awards.
The support for and commitment to arbitration vary within the
world community. 7 Judicial laissez-faire as to arbitration is especially
characteristic of courts in developed Western nations.8 In other

award of punitive damages was unconscionable and, therefore, void); Cavalier Mfg.,
Inc. v. Jackson, 2001 Ala. LEXIS 373, *12 (Oct. 5, 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1536
(2002) (holding that an arbitral clause prohibiting an arbitrator from awarding
punitive damages violated public policy); Hayes v. County Bank, 713 N.Y.S.2d 267, 270
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000) (holding that an arbitral clause in a pay-day loan scheme was
unconscionable and unenforceable); see also Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570,
574 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 935 (N.D. Cal. 2002);
Ting v. AT&T, 319 F. 3d 1126, 1149 (9th Cir. 2003) (certiorariapplied for).
6.
Most, perhaps all, modern arbitration statutes allow courts to supervise the
arbitral process on the basis of the enforceability of the arbitral agreement and award.
The supervision that is allowed ordinarily is quite restricted and narrow; it generally
results in the enforcement of the award unless there has been a fundamental breach of
adjudicatory legitimacy or the blatant use of excessive powers by the arbitrators. The
FAA is characteristic of other statutes on this point. See CARBONNEAU, CASES AND
MATERIALS, supra note 2, at 48-54.
7.
For an account of national policies on arbitration, see generally
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: NATIONAL REPORTS, BASIC

LEGAL TEXTS (Pieter Sanders ed., 1984); HANS SMIT & VRATISLAV PECHOTA, THE
WORLD ARBITRATION REPORTER (1987 to the present).

8.
On the question of deregulation, see generally CLIVE M. SCHMITTHOFF,
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1975); Ulrich Drobnig, Assessing Arbitral
Autonomy in European Statutory Law, in LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION: A
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countries and regions of the world, the protection of local enterprises
can sometimes become more compelling, and political, religious, or
cultural attitudes can disfavor arbitration, or at least some forms or
aspects of it. 9 Protectionism and parochialism, however, are shortsighted and are likely to be counterproductive in the long run. They
foster an isolationism based upon fear and insecurity and prevent the
state of origin and outside countries from developing any real
confidence in the local culture and its legal and economic institutions.
The Western, developed-state (and commercially predominant)
view is that, no matter its degree, judicial intervention, in matters of
transborder or domestic arbitration, is antagonistic to the autonomy
and functionality of arbitration. 10 In the international arena, judicial

DISCUSSION OF THE NEW LAW MERCHANT 195 (Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., rev. ed.
1998).
9.
The protection of local interests and entities was clearly evident in the
decision of the Cairo Court of Appeal in the Chromalloy case. Chromalloy Aeroservices
v. Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1996) (granting Chromalloy's petition to enforce the
arbitral award and declining to grant res judicata effect to the decision of the Cairo
Court of Appeal). There, a Houston-based company had gained an award against the
Egyptian Air Force for breach of contract. Id. at 908. The ICC administered the
arbitration; it took place in Egypt, and the arbitrators applied Egyptian law. Id. The
court nonetheless set aside the award under Article V(1)(e) of the New York
Arbitration Convention because the arbitrators' application of Egyptian law allegedly
violated Egyptian public policy. Id. The true rationale for the decision appears to have
been that the imposition of liability through the international arbitral process upon the
Egyptian Air Force was simply unacceptable for both juridical and political reasons. Id.
Under traditional Islamic law, it may not be permissible to have a women serve as
an arbitrator. See CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 2, at 1199. If an
award is rendered by a female arbitrator or by a tribunal including a woman
arbitrator, the award may not be enforceable in Islamic countries. Id. Also, under
traditional Islamic law, a dispute involving a Muslim person or entity cannot be
resolved by an arbitral tribunal with a non-Muslim arbitrator. Id.
On the idiosyncratic Japanese view of arbitration, see supra note 2 and
accompanying text. For the particularities of arbitration law and practice in China and
India, see CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 2, at 1189, 1195.
In this regard, the decision of the Supreme Court of Panama on December 13, 2001
was particularly disturbing. See CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 2, at
1200. The court ruled that, under Panamanian law, the arbitral doctrine of kompetenzkompetenz was unconstitutional. Id. The decision has chilled enthusiasm and support
for international commercial arbitration; despite the analytical rectitude of the
reasoning, it represents a parochial and dated attitude toward arbitration. Id.
10.
The goal of reducing judicial intervention in matters of arbitration has been
the central objective of modern legislation on arbitration. See generally S. BULL, THE
ARBITRATION PROCESS AND THE COURTS (1983); G. MOSS CORDERO, INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: PARTY AUTONOMY AND MANDATORY RULES (1999); L.Y.
Fortier, The Never-Ending Struggle Between Arbitratorsand Judges in International
Commercial Arbitration, in LAW OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY: LIBER AMICORUM KARL-HEINZ BOCKSTIEGEL 177 (R.
Briner, L.Y. Fortier, K.P. Berger, & J. Bredow, eds., 2001); HANS SMIT & VRATISLAV
PECHOTA, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE COURTS (3d ed. 2002);
Ronald Bernstein, Arbitration and the Courts, 59 ARBITRATION 4 (1993); Georges R.
Delaume, ICSID Arbitration and the Courts, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 784 (1983); Honorable
Lord Justice Donaldson, Relationship Between the Courts and Arbitration Under the
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interference with arbitration, therefore, thwarts the pursuit of
international business itself. Merchants will not conduct business
across national boundaries if there is no guarantee of either basic
contractual accountability or the provision of remedies for material
breach of contract."
Arbitration civilizes the international
marketplace and thereby makes it accessible to commercial parties.
Arbitration may not be able to right the geo-political and socioeconomic disparities in the world community, but it can provide a
workable form of world adjudicatory and transactional justice. It
12
makes the risks of transborder commerce palatable.
In domestic U.S. matters, hindering the recourse to arbitration
through judicial supervision lessens the parties' access to an
adjudicatory remedy that actually works. In arbitration, disputing
parties have a forum. They are heard and can respond to the
allegations made against them. The ruling of the tribunal is usually
fair and final. Undoing the effectiveness of this process through
judicial supervision could eventually result in a society-wide denial of
justice.
The freedom-of-contract reasoning that underlies the legal
doctrine on arbitration in transborder practice and national law
aligns itself with a conservative U.S. domestic political ideology. The
law of arbitration ostensibly emphasizes individual responsibility and
accountability when it provides that arbitration agreements will be
enforced as written. 13 It thereby reduces the role of the state and the
prospect of state regulation. 14 The marketplace becomes the central
purveyor of norms. In contradistinction to international arbitral
practice, freedom of contract, however, plays a qualified role in
judicial opinions involving domestic arbitrations. 15 In many cases,
courts are bent on the enforcement of agreements rather than giving
effect to the parties' freedom of contract. 16 The domestic bargains for
arbitration generally do not arise from the free operation of market
forces. In most instances, arbitration agreements, in fact, reflect the

European Common Law Systems, 47 ARB. 72 (1981); Sir Anthony Evans, Court
Intervention in Maritime Arbitration,[1999] ARB. & DISP. RES. L. J. 40; Peter Schlosser,
The Competence of Arbitrators and of Courts, 8 ARB. INT'L 189 (1992).
11.
See John Goldring, Consumer Protection, Globalizationand Democracy, 6
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 13 (1998).

12.
See generally Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Ballad of Trans-border
Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 773 (2002).
13.
See Volt Info. Sciences v. Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489
U.S. 468, 500 (1989).
14.
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
15.
See, e.g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 64
(1995) (holding that the arbitral award should have been enforced as within the scope
of the contract between the parties).
16.
Id. at 62 ("Ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself [are]
resolved in favor of the arbitration").
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position of the economically dominant party. 17 In affirming these
agreements, courts often turn a blind eye to their unilateral and
adhesionary character.' 8 In domestic consumer and employment
contracts, the recourse to arbitration is a non-negotiable precondition
to contracting. 9 Companies benefit because they can avoid the
courts. There are no public proceedings or civil juries in arbitration,
and the availability of class action relief and punitive damages is at
20
least less certain.
The political undercurrents of the legal doctrine on arbitration do
not appear to have had much, if any, impact upon the U.S. Supreme
Court. 2 1 In the main, the Court has exhibited an apolitical
demeanor. 22 It has, however, been steadfast in its objective of
achieving a substantively uniform and uniformly applied law of
arbitration. 23 The Court has also been intolerant of allowing
exceptions to the general proposition of the enforceability of arbitral
agreements and awards. 24 Arbitration for the Court is a means for
25
securing civil justice within the U.S. legal system.
A final preliminary point needs to be made in regard to the law
of arbitration. The decisions in Scherk26 and Mitsubishi27 confirmed
what legal science had asserted all along: there was a recognizable
and meaningful distinction between the international and domestic
aspects of law. Accordingly, the Court could establish rules in the
international context that were completely inapposite
for
incorporation into the domestic regulation applying to the same

17.
See Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 180-81 (3d Cir. 1999)
(holding that mutuality is not required to bind parties to an agreement to arbitrate).
18.
See, e.g., id. at 81; Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 9192 (2000); Great W. Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 227-28 (3d Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 915 (1997); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,
32-33 (1991).
19.
See, e.g., Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23 (involving an employer's requirement that
an employee register as a securities representative with the New York Stock Exchange,
which includes an arbitration agreement).
20.
See CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 2, at 466-70.
21.
See Michael R. Holden, Arbitration of State-Law Claims by Employees: An
Argument for Containing Federal Arbitration Law, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1695, 1742
(1995) (stating that the "Supreme Court's recent FAA decisions make the 'federal policy
favoring arbitration' nearly dispositive").
22.
Id.
23.
Id.
24.
See, e.g., Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686-87 (1996);
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995).
25.
See Thomas E. Carbonneau, Beyond Trilogies: A New Bill of Rights and
Law PracticeThrough the Contractof Arbitration,6 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 1, 4 (1995).
26.
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 534 (1974), reh'g denied, 419
U.S. 885 (1974).
27.
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
625 (1985).

20031

INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION

1197

subject matter. 28 The needs of international business and transborder
adjudication may have required the arbitrability of securities and
antitrust disputes, but such statutory and regulatory conflicts
remained outside the purview of arbitration in domestic
transactions. 29 There was, therefore, an international and domestic
law of arbitration-fully distinguishable in terms of underlying
30
interests and dynamics, as well as on major issues of doctrine.
The Court, however, eventually eliminated the boundary
between these two branches of arbitration law. It began to integrate
the holdings of international arbitration cases into the domestic law
of arbitration and to sever the rules elaborated in the holdings from
the specialty of transborder circumstances. 31 Statements asserting
that statutory disputes were arbitrable in international business
transactions for reasons of conflicts avoidance were transformed into
propositions declaring that the governing domestic arbitration law
(the Federal Arbitration Act, or FAA) contained no prohibition
against the arbitrability of statutory disputes. 32 Moreover, the legal

28.
The Bremen and Scherk decisions establish a strong presumption in favor
of the enforcement of freely negotiated contractual choice-of-forum provisions. See
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15; Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519. Here, as in
Scherk, that presumption is reinforced by the emphatic federal policy in favor of
arbitral dispute resolution. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 631; Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519.
"At least since this Nation's accession in 1970 to the [New York Arbitration]
Convention, . ..
that federal policy applies with special force in the field of
international commercial disputes." Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 631.
29.
"[Elven assuming that a contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic
context." Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 629.
30.
See id. at 629-31; see also CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note
2, at 877-92.
31.

In Mitsubishi . . , we recognized that arbitral tribunals are readily
capable of handling the factual and legal complexities of antitrust claims,
notwithstanding the absence of judicial instruction and supervision....
The suitability of arbitration as a means of enforcing Exchange Act rights
is evident from our decision in Scherk. Although the holding in that case
was limited to international agreements, the competence of arbitral
tribunals to resolve §10(b) claims is the same in both settings.

Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987).
32.

The Arbitration Act thus establishes a 'federal policy favoring
arbitration.' . . . This duty to enforce arbitration agreements is not
diminished when a party bound by an agreement raises a claim founded
on statutory rights. As we observed in Mitsubishi, . . . 'we are well past
the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of
the competence of arbitral tribunals' should inhibit enforcement of the
Act 'in controversies based on statutes.'. . . Absent a well-founded claim
that an arbitration agreement resulted from the sort of fraud or excessive
economic power that 'would provide grounds "for the revocation of any
contract,"' . . . the Arbitration Act 'provides no basis for disfavoring
agreements to arbitrate statutory claims by skewing the otherwise
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system's preoccupation with conflicts or choice-of-law considerations,
in evidence since the end of WW II, 3a was on the wane. It was being
replaced by an aspiration for the unity of law. Many states adopted
the UNCITRAL Model Law3 4 as their domestic law of arbitration.

hospitable inquiry into arbitrability.' . . . The Arbitration Act, standing
alone, therefore mandates enforcement of agreements to arbitrate
statutory claims.
Id. at 226.
That preoccupation is reflected in and accounts for the title of the New
33.
York Arbitration Convention-the UN Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards. Since it was opened for signature in June 1958, the New
York Arbitration Convention, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3, codified 9 U.S.C.A.
§§ 201-08 (1970), has embodied the international consensus on international
commercial arbitration. On the Convention, see generally G. GAJA, THE NEW YORK
CONVENTION (1979); A. JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION

OF 1958 (1981); Leonard V. Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of ForeignArbitral Awards, 70
YALE L.J. 1049 (1961). Drafted in the post-WWII period during the apogee of the
choice-of-law and conflicts school of thought, the Convention paid the necessary
reverence to the application of national law in the regulation of arbitration. Quigley,
supra at 1059. It also established a nearly irrebuttable presumption of enforceability
for arbitral agreements and awards. Id. at 1061. It eventually acted as the conduit for
giving expression to the "a-national" view of arbitration and of its regulation. The
Convention's objective was not so much to promote party choice as the rule of law in
arbitration, but rather to establish a self-regulating transborder process for conducting
international arbitrations. Giving full effect to state laws and conflict rules would have
rendered the procedure of arbitration less workable and less effective; international
commerce would have been compromised and globalization might never have taken
place.
The conflicts or choice-of-law approach that dominated legal thinking at this time
emphasized the determination of the nationality of awards and distinguishing between
national and foreign awards. See generally Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Unbound: Award
Detached from the Law of its Country of Origin, 30 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 358, 568 (1981).
Given the uniformly favorable provisions of most national laws on arbitration, the
distinction between national and foreign awards lost its significance. Id. at 363-64.
Foreign or non-domestic awards are now considered international or transborder
awards. For more information on this topic, see generally V.S. Deshpande, 'Foreign
Award' in the 1958 New York Convention, J. INT'L ARB., Dec. 1992, at 51; Mark B.
Feldman, An Award Made in New York Can Be a Foreign ArbitrationAward, ARB. J.,
March 1984, at 14; Julian Lew, Nationality of InternationalCommercial Arbitration,5
BUS. L. REV. 318 (1984); Mauro Rubino-Sammartano, International and Foreign
Arbitration, J. INT'L ARB., Sept. 1988, at 85 (1988); Albert Jan van den Berg, NonDomestic Arbitral Awards under the 1958 New York Convention, 2 ARB. INT'L 191
(1986).
34.
The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration,
adopted June 21, 1985, codifies the modern trans-border consensus on international
commercial arbitration. U.N. Doc. A/40/17/Annex 1 (1985). It adopts and incorporates
into its provisions the liberalist approach to the regulation of arbitration. Id. It also
acknowledges the central significance of party autonomy in the process of international
commercial arbitration. Id. For example, in providing a definition of international
arbitration, Article 1(3)(c) of the Model Law states that an "arbitration is international
if . . . the parties have expressly agreed that the subject-matter of the arbitration
agreement relates to more than one country." Id. The Model Law has served as the
basis for statutory enactments on arbitration in a number of states (among them,
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The legal regime on arbitration was being substantially liberalized in
all its aspects. In some cases, the internal law on arbitration was less
accommodating
restrictive
of arbitration
than the highly
35
international framework.
It is, therefore, difficult-if not inaccurate-to refer separately to
the international and domestic dimension of arbitration law, at least
in terms of U.S. arbitration law. The U.S. Supreme Court no longer
makes the distinction and is articulating rules of arbitration law that
are of general application and not fitted to any special
circumstances. 36 The analysis that follows incorporates that feature
of the case law. It focuses upon general principles and concepts of the
law of arbitration without underscoring any allegiance to the
international or the domestic setting. The discussion, however, does
emphasize the difference in rationale that might accompany the
application of the rule in these different settings. As the title of this
article indicates, it addresses generically the topic of the making of
arbitration agreements.

California, Connecticut, Illinois, Oregon, and Texas) and in a multitude of foreign
countries (for example, Canada, Germany, Iran, Japan, Singapore, Spain, and
Venezuala). On the Model Law, see generally ISSAK I. DORE, THE UNCITRAL
FRAMEWORK FOR ARBITRATION IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE (1993; HOWARD M.
HOLTZMANN & JOSEPH E. NEUHAUS, A GUIDE TO THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND COMMENTARY
(1989); Aron Broches, Commentary on the UNCITRAL Model Law, in INTERNATIONAL
HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (Peter Sanders & A. Jan van den Berg eds.,
1984 & Supp. Jan. 11, 1990); Gerold Herrmann, UNCITRAL Adopts Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration,2 ARB. INT'L 2 (1986); Sigvard Jarvin, La loitype de la C.N.U.D.C.I. sur l'arbitragecommercial international, 1986 REV. ARB. 509.
On the experience with the Model Law in individual countries, see, e.g., Emmanuel
Gaillard, The UNCITRAL Model Law and Recent Statutes on InternationalArbitration
in Europe and North America, 2 FOR. INV. L. J. 424 (1987); Hamid G. Gharavi, The
1997 IranianInternationalCommercialArbitration Law: The UNCITRAL Model Law &
L'Iranienne, 15 ARB. INT'L 85 (1999); Sami Kallel, The Tunisian Draft Law on
InternationalArbitration, J. INT'L ARB., Dec. 1992, at 71; Neil Koplan, The Model Law
in Hong Kong-Two Years On, 8 ARB. INT'L 223 (1992); Robert K. Paterson,
Implementing the UNCITRAL Model Law-The Canadian Experience, J. INT'L ARB.,
June 1993, at 29; Andrew Rogers, The UNCITRAL Model Law: An Australian
Perspective, 5 ARB. INT'L 348 (1989); M. Sornarajah, The UNCITRAL Model Law: A
Third World Viewpoint, J. INT'L ARB., Dec. 1989, at 7; Frank-Bernd Weigand, The
UNCITRAL Model Law: New Draft Arbitration Acts in Germany and Sweden, 11 ARB.
INT'L 397 (1995); and Zhang Yulin, Towards the UNCITRAL Model Law--A Chinese
Perspective, J. INT'L ARB., March 1994, at 87.
35.
This is the case when Article V of the New York Arbitration is compared to
FAA Section 10. The latter contains neither a public policy exception nor a subjectmatter inarbitrability defense to enforcement.
36.
See Eric J. Fuglsang, The Arbitrability of Domestic Antitrust Disputes:
Where Does the Law Stand? 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 779, 801-07 (1997).
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THE EFFECT AND DEVELOPMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS

The content of an arbitration agreement can have an enormous
impact upon the rights of contracting parties. First, an agreement to
37
arbitrate eliminates the parties' right to have recourse to courts.
Parties thereby forego the protection of judicial procedures. The
surrender of judicial relief is a more critical consideration in domestic
matters. National courts and laws are ill-suited for international
commercial litigation.38 The transacting parties' interests are actually
furthered by not referring their disputes to courts. Relinquishing
judicial recourse in domestic matters can have a negative impact
upon rights protection. Even in this setting, however, the judicial
safeguarding of rights may be more theoretical than real. Arbitration
has achieved prominence domestically in large measure because
courts are inaccessible to prospective litigants. Delays and costs make
judicial litigation remote and unattractive.3 9 In any event, the
bargain for arbitration generally represents a diminution of
(theoretical) rights protection to achieve greater functionality in the
adjudicatory mechanism.
Second, the agreement to arbitrate delegates the determination
of individual rights to a private and basically unregulated arbitration
services industry. 40 More particularly, the reference to arbitration
authorizes private people to function as judges. The arbitrators decide
the parties' disputes. Marketplace factors (the need for service
providers to secure business and the arbitrators' desire for

37.
"[A] party who has not agreed to arbitrate will normally have a right to a
court's decision about the merits of its dispute . . . [W]here the party has agreed to
arbitrate, he or she, in effect, has relinquished much of that right's practical value."
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995).
38.
See, e.g., CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 2, at 765-67.
39.
See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 439 (1953) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting); Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 409-10 (2d
Cir. 1959).
40.
On this topic, see generally HANS SMIT & VRATISLAV PECHOTA, ARBITRATION
RULES-NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (1998). The basic service providers include: The
American Arbitration Association (AAA), The International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC), The London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), the Stockholm Chamber
of Commerce, the Zurich Chamber of Commerce, the Geneva Chamber of Commerce,
the National Arbitration Forum (NAF), the International Center for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID), the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD),
the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC), and
the Singapore Center for International Arbitration. For a description of these various
institutions, see generally RONALD BERNSTEIN, HANDBOOK OF ARBITRATION PRACTICE
(1993); J. GILLIS WETTER, THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL PROCESS: PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE (1979); Phillippe Fouchard, Typologie des institutions d'arbitrage, 1990 REV.
ARB. 281; I-TV.
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reappointment) and institutional regulations 41 are the only limits
placed upon the industry and its players. Moreover, both arbitrators
and arbitral institutions are immune from suit for their professional
conduct relating to the arbitration. 42 For example, while stipulations
in the arbitration agreement must be followed, the consequence of a
failure by the arbitrators or the arbitral institution to respect such
stipulations affects only the arbitral award.43 The problematic
professional conduct giving rise to the defective award is itself
insulated from accountability.
Third, as the law of arbitration develops, there is a need to
consider engaging in more complex arbitration agreements. 44 The

41.
Each of the administering institutions has its own set of arbitration rules.
See generally JOHN J. KERR & HANS SMIT, COMPARISON OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION RULES (2d ed. 2002); HANS SMIT & VRATISLAV PECHOTA, A CHART
COMPARING INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES (1998).
42.
See THE IMMUNITY OF ARBITRATORS (Julian D.M. Lew ed., 1990); David

Bristow, The Gathering Storm of Mediator and ArbitratorLiability, 55 DISP. RES. J. 15
(2000); Philippe Fouchard, Le statut de l'arbitre dans la jurisprudencefrangaise, 1996
REV. ARB. 325; C. Mulcahy, Arbitrator's Immunity Under the New Arbitration Act, 62
ARB. 202 (1996).

43.
See Bristow, supra note 42, at 16 ("[T]he view of arbitrators as possessing a
level of arbitral immunity is so well-established in tort law that it is rarely
challenged").
44.
Given the importance of the topic, it is surprising not to find more extensive
writing on it. In addition, the existing literature is mostly practical in nature and
shuns the theoretical issues that give rise to the problems of practice. Also, these
treatments avoid giving actual professional advice on writing arbitration agreements.
Overall, the best source is probably Paul Friedland's book. PAUL FRIEDLAND,
ARBITRATION CLAUSES FOR INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS (2000). The classic article is

Eisemann's piece in which he coins the phrase "pathological arbitral clause." Fr6d6ric
Eisemann, La Clause d'Arbitrage Pathologique, in A.I.A., ESSAYS IN MEMORIAM
EUGENIO MINOLI 129 (1974).

For other books on the topic, see also R. BUDIN, LES CLAUSES ARBITRALES
INTERNATIONALES BIPARTITES, MULTIPARTITES ET SPECIALES DE L'ARBITRAGE "AD
HOC" ET INSTITUTIONNEL (1993); JAN PAULSSON, ET AL., THE FRESHFIELDS GUIDE TO

ARBITRATION AND ADR: CLAUSES IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS (2d rev. ed. 1999).
For book chapters treating the issue, see Guido Alpa, La Clausola Arbitrale Nei
Contratti Dei Consumatori, in 7 REVISTA DELL'ARBITRATO 657 (1997); Giuseppe
Franchi, Le Contenu Necessaire De La Clause CompromissoireSelon Le Droit Italien, in
A.I.A., ESSAYS IN MEMORIAM EUGENIO MINOLI 179 (1974); Philippe Fouchard, La
Rgdaction Des Conventions D'Arbitrage, in CENTRE D'ETUDES, DE RECHERCHES ET DE
PUBLICATIONS, LES ENTREPRISES TUNISIENNES ET L'ARBITRAGE

G6linas,

Arbitration

Clauses:

Achieving

Effectiveness,

in

97 (1983);

Paul A.

IMPROVING

THE

EFFECTIVENESS OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND AWARDS 47 (A. Jan van den Berg

ed., 1999); Gerold Herrmann, The Arbitration Agreement as the Foundation of
Arbitration and Its Recognition by the Courts, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN A
CHANGING WORLD 41 (A. Jan van den Berg ed., 1994); Julian D.M. Lew, Arbitration
Agreements:

Form and Character, in

ESSAYS

ON

INTERNATIONAL

COMMERCIAL

ARBITRATION 51 (Petar Sarcevic ed., 1989); Christoph Pestalozzi, The Validity of
Arbitration Clauses under N.Y. UCC § 2-207 (The Battle of Forms), in DR. LEE
JAECHUL, IN CELEBRATION OF HIS 60TH BIRTHDAY, 2 STUDIES ON MODERN CIVIL &
COMMERCIAL LAW 615 (1984).
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standard clauses are well recognized and highly economical
statements of party intent as to arbitration, usually to the effect that
"any dispute arising under this contract shall be submitted to
arbitration under the rules of [an arbitration institution]. ' 45 Because
the standard clause is simple, straightforward, and well known, there

For articles, see Sam Aaron, International Arbitration: Drafting an Arbitration
Clause for InternationalCommercial Contracts, 107 SOUTH AFR. L.J. 633 (1990); C.F.
Amerasinghe, How to Use the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes By Reference To Its Model Clauses, 13 INDIAN J. INT'L. L. 530 (1973);
Markham Ball, Just Do It-Drafting the Arbitration Clause in an International
Agreement, J.INT'L. ARB., Dec. 1993, at 29; Piero Bernardini, The ArbitrationClause of
an InternationalContract, J. INT'L ARB., June 1992, at 45; Andr6 Beyly, The Manager
and Arbitration, J. INT'L ARB., Mar. 1986, at 7; Bienvenu, Guide de rgdaction des
clauses d'arbitrageet de droit applicabledans les contrats commerciaux internationaux,
56 REV. Du BARREAU 39 (1996); Marc Blessing, Drafting Arbitration Clauses, 5 AM.
REV. INT'L. ARB. 54 (1994); Stephen R. Bond, How To Draft An Arbitration Clause, J.
INT'L ARB., June 1989, at 65; Xavier Boucobza, La Clause Compromissoire Par
Rfdrence En Matire D'Arbitrage Commercial International, 1998 REV. ARB. 495;
Edgar H. Brenner, InternationalArbitration: There Is No Standard Clause, 49 ARB. 20
(1983); Benjamin G. Davis, Pathological Clauses: Frddric Eisemann's Still Vital
Criteria,7 ARB. J. 365 (1991); Andrew B. Derman, Nationalization and the Protective
Arbitration Clause, J. INT'L ARB., Dec. 1998, at 131; Robert Donald Fisher & Roger S.
Haydock, International Commercial Disputes Drafting an Enforceable Arbitration
Agreement, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 941 (1996); Dana H. Freyer, Practical
Considerationsin DraftingDispute Resolution Provisionsin InternationalCommercial
Contracts:A U.S. Perspective,J. INT'L ARB., Dec. 1998, at 7; Emmanuel Gaillard, Some
Notes on the Drafting of ICSID Arbitration Clauses, 3 FOREIGN INV. L.J. 136 (1988);
Peter Koh, The Incorporation and Effect of Arbitration Clauses in Maritime/Shipping
Contracts, 29 BULL. JAPAN SHIP. ExCH. 19 (1994); Richard H. Kreindler, Practical
Issues in Drafting International Arbitration Clauses, 63 ARB. 47 (1997); J. Stewart
McClendon, Arbitration Clauses in InternationalContracts, [1994] ARB. & DISP. RES.
L.J. 251; Jay G. Martin, Checklist for Drafting Arbitration Clauses in International
Commercial Contracts, 16 CORP. COUNSEL Q. 65 (2000); Sandra Obuljen, Joint Venture
Agreements: Drafting Arbitration Clauses, 6 CROATIAN ARB. Y.B. 141 (1999); William
Park & Jan Paulsson, Arbitrage commercial et contracts internationaux, 45 REV. DU
BARREAU 215 (1985); Michael Pryles, DraftingArbitrationAgreements, AUS. L.J., July
1993, at 503; Alan Scott Rau & Catherine Pedamon, La contractualisation de
l'arbitrage: le module americain, 2001 REV. ARB. 451; Moishe Reiter & Richard
Carleton, Arbitration clauses and submissions, 3 INT'L CONSTRUCTION L. REV. 181
(1986); James M. Rhodes & Lisa Sloan, The Pitfalls of International Commercial
Arbitration,17 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 19 (1984); Hughes Scalbert & Laurent Marville, Les
clauses compromissoires pathologiques, 1988 REV. ARB. 117; Karin A. Schl6sser,
Arbitration Clauses in Maritime Contracts and their Binding Effect on Groups of
Companies,J. INT'L ARB., Dec. 1994, at 127; Clive M. Schmitthoff, Defective Arbitration
Clauses, [1975] J. BUS. L. 9; Bijan Sohrabi, Jurisdiction At Bay - The Validity of
Foreign Arbitration Clauses in Maritime Bills of Lading Under Section 3(8) of COGSA:
A Comment on Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros v. M/V Sky Reefer, 7 AM. REV. INT'L ARB.
71 (1996); William Tetley, Arbitration Clauses In Ocean Bills Of Lading, 2 Y.B. MAR. L.
51 (1985-1986); John M. Townsend, Drafting Arbitration Clauses: Avoiding the 7
Deadly Sins, 58-1 DISP. RES. J.28 (2003); Nicholas C. Ulmer, Drafting the International
Arbitration Clause, 20 INT'L LAWYER 1335 (1986); Vera Van Houtte, Consent to
Arbitration Through Agreement to Printed Contracts: The Continental Experience, 16
ARB. INT'L 1 (2000).

45.

See generally Ulmer, supra note 44.
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is an understandable reluctance among legal practitioners and
business parties to deviate from its established pattern. The greater
sophistication of the law of arbitration, however, is undeniable and
should inform contemporary arbitration agreements in some fashion.
Expanded agreements, in fact, may allow lawyers who participate in
the arbitral process to avoid professional malpractice. 46 A modern
arbitration agreement should make clear the parties' intent to
arbitrate disputes, but it should also reflect an appreciation of the
development of the law. Educating clients on these matters is
necessary. Custom fitting arbitration to the parties and the
transaction, while maintaining the functionality of the process, is the
cardinal objective.
The need for more complex arbitration agreements can be
illustrated by the use of the term "dispute." It may have been
sufficient previously simply to refer, in the arbitral clause, to "all
disputes arising." The case law, however, has made the choice of
terminology more difficult. Because the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
that the FAA contained no restriction as to the arbitrability of
statutory rights, 4 7 "all disputes arising" could include both contract
and statutory causes of action arising between the parties. To make
the reference to arbitration more effective, following the holding in
Mitsubishi,48 the federal case law elaborated a presumption that the
49
term "dispute" referred both to contract and to statutory disputes.
The presumption can be rebutted by express stipulation to the
contrary in the contract at the outset of the transaction. 50 Finally, the
ruling in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan5i added even more
content to the traditional usage of "dispute." In Kaplan, the U.S.
Supreme Court determined that, under U.S. law, contracting parties
could agree to submit jurisdictional challenges to the arbitrators

46.
The failure to inform clients of the consequences of including or omitting
language from an agreement to arbitrate can entail the professional liability of legal
counsel. Id.
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
47.
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
48.
640 (1985).
49.
See id. at 626-27 ("[A]s with any other contract, the parties' intentions [in
an arbitration agreement] control, but those intentions are generously construed as to
issues of arbitrability. There is no reason to depart from these guidelines where a party
bound by an arbitration agreement raises claims founded on statutory rights").
This is the sense of the Court's statement that "nothing . . . prevents a
50.
party from excluding statutory claims from the scope of an agreement to arbitrate. Id.
at 628.
51.
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995).

1204

VANDERBILTIOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 36.1189

rather than having a court of law decide them. 52 Clients and their
counsel then could attempt to integrate kompetenz-kompetenz powers
53
into the arbitration contract.
Accordingly, under U.S. arbitration law, the wording of an
arbitration agreement can become a highly meaningful enterprise. At
a minimum, clients must be advised of the possible ramifications of
the language. In the U.S. context, a clause that accounts for the
current state of the law on the scope of the reference to arbitration
might read as follows: "Any dispute arising under or pursuant to this
agreement-whether it is contractual, statutory, regulatory, or
jurisdictional in character, and regardless of whether it arises under
state or federal law or pursuant to an international treaty-shall be
'54
submitted to arbitration.
Fourth, more customized and elaborate agreements can take into
account a wider variety of circumstantial configurations. These
agreements can address such factors as the place of arbitration and
its impact on the proceedings; the number and qualifications of
arbitrators; the selective or mixed recourse to institutional rules of
arbitration; the use of discovery mechanisms, experts, and crossexamination in the arbitration proceedings; the form and content of
the award; the law governing the contract and the arbitration; and
the standard of judicial review applicable to the arbitral award.

III. THE

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The initial and primary inquiry is whether the "contract freedom
approach" to the making of arbitration agreements is desirable and
whether it remains beneficial to legal counsel and the contracting
parties. What are the advantages and drawbacks to deregulation in
arbitral practice? Does efficiency or effectiveness always and
everywhere win out over the protection of rights and the public
interest that are implicated by the arbitral process? A judicial process
that is only capable of prosecuting crimes provides only part of the
social civilization that should proceed from the law. For different
reasons, arbitration provides the necessary civil component to the

52.

The Court wrote:

[T]he question 'who has the primary power to decide arbitrability' turns upon
what the parties agreed about that matter. Did the parties agree to submit the
arbitrability question itself to arbitration? If so, then the court's standard for
reviewing the arbitrator's decision about that matter should not differ from the
standard courts apply when they review any other matter that parties have
agreed to arbitrate.
Id.
53.

Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 642-47.

54.

See CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 2, at 749.
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justice equation in both domestic and international matters. It is also
clear that the full integration of democratic and due process values
into the arbitration process would significantly compromise the
operation of arbitral proceedings and-perhaps-the very raison
d'6tre for having recourse to the arbitral mechanism.
Despite its provision of efficiency and functionality, should the
deregulation of arbitration be absolute? Must the enacted law on
arbitration always have a secondary, default status in all
circumstances and in every transaction? Are some limits (perhaps
pertaining to the arbitrability of disputes) feasible, warranted, or
essential as to various aspects of arbitration's scope of application?
What type of restraints should be considered and how extensive
should they be? Should they proceed from public interest
considerations, a rights-protection rationale, or only from issues
pertaining specifically to the operation of the arbitral process? From
whose authority might such limits proceed?

IV. THE CONTENT OF "MODERN" ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS

Given the likelihood of enforcement of the contractual reference
to arbitration in national legal systems and transborder legal
practice, what advice should legal counsel give to clients in terms of
submitting disputes to arbitration? Should the basic practice be to
use the standard clause with only minor modifications for truly
exceptional circumstances? What content is or should be essential to
all arbitration agreements? Are peripheral elements equally
necessary? How can the best use be made of the parties' freedom of
contract? Can rights and interests be sufficiently safeguarded? Will
the process continue to be effective when practice is more
particularized?
A. The Recourse to Arbitration: Voluntary, Necessary, or Coerced?
Whether recourse should be had to arbitration is an initial
question that must be considered in nearly all circumstances. In
transborder commercial matters, choosing to arbitrate goes almost
without saying, because international arbitration is instrumental to
neutrality, the provision of the necessary expertise, effective dispute
resolution, and the enforcement of awards. 55 In these circumstances,
the more critical and difficult question centers upon the type of
reference made to arbitration. If the avoidance of national courts is a
prerequisite to effective international transacting, should recourse to

55.

Id. at 765.
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arbitral adjudication be preceded by direct negotiation or an attempt
to mediate the dispute? The existence of remedial precursors to
arbitration raises the problem of the coordination and
implementation of agreed-upon remedies. Time limits are usually
effective devices in such settings. The contracting parties need to
understand their dispute resolution needs and preferences in order to
choose effectively.
Finality and enforceability are central to any dispute resolution
process. Functionality-in terms of economy, efficiency, and
effectiveness-is another highly prized objective. Additionally, parties
may want to provide for greater rights protection or may seek to
preserve their business relationship no matter how difficult a
particular transaction may become. Different or adapted remedies
can achieve these ends.
In the domestic arena, the necessity of arbitration was not the
result of a general consensus within the affected professional
community. 56 The need for arbitral recourse was propounded by the
U.S. Supreme Court. 57 In fact, the Court reduced the rigor of the law
of contract to achieve the legal validity of questionable agreements to
arbitrate. 58 As a result, unilaterally imposed agreements to arbitrate
which altered or limited or even eliminated the rights of the weaker
party generally became enforceable under FAA Section Two. 59 Under

the Court's strained doctrine, recourse to arbitration-as a matter of
law-did not affect substantive rights and was always in the parties'
best interest. 60 Arbitration was nothing more or less than another
type of trial process. The law, therefore, validates non-negotiated
arbitration agreements and allows the superior party to select a
procedure that favors its interests.6 1 Mutuality has not been the
hallmark of arbitration agreements in the domestic employment and
62
consumer contexts.

56.

Id. at 466.

57.

Id.

58.
See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S.
477, 479-84 (1989) ("[Tlhe old judiciary hostility to arbitration ... has been steadily
eroded over the years").
59.
See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148-51 (7th Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 808 (1997).
60.
"By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an
arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum." Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Solar ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
61.
See CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 2, at 375, 466.
62.
Id.
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B. InstitutionalArbitration
Parties should decide whether they will engage in institutional
or ad hoc arbitration. This particular issue is not difficult because
most parties are likely to choose institutional arbitration even though
it involves greater threshold costs. Ad hoc arbitration-usually done
through the application of the UNCITRAL Model Rules on
Arbitration 63-requires that the parties establish and manage, as
well as participate in, the arbitration. Such an approach places a
substantial burden upon the parties to cooperate in the circumstances
of dispute. The expectation of cooperation is likely to be unrealistic.
Moreover, arbitral institutions have a good professional track record
and have significant experience in the administrative aspects of
arbitrations. n4 Unless the parties themselves have substantial
expertise in the arbitration process, institutional arbitration becomes
a virtual necessity. Also, an award rendered under the auspices of a
recognized arbitral institution may have a greater likelihood of
enforcement for reasons of institutional reputation. The real question
involves choosing among the arbitral institutions.
In transborder arbitrations, the critical considerations governing
the choice of an arbitral institution include: availability, costs, and
the value of the institutional service rendered. 6 5 The number of
institutional choices has increased. In addition to the standard
bearers-the ICC and the LCIA, parties can also have recourse to
CIETAC arbitration and to the AAA Center for International Dispute
Resolution (in New York City or in Dublin, Ireland). 66 Other
traditional forms of transborder arbitration include World Bank or
ICSID Arbitration, Inter-American Commission Arbitration, or
67
NAFTA Arbitration.
There are a number of distinctions between the various
institutions. The ICC, for example, charges a percentage of the
amount in dispute, whereas the LCIA administers arbitrations on the

63.
RULES:

See IssAK I. DORE, ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION UNDER THE UNCITRAL
A TEXTUAL

ANALYSIS

182,

213

(1986);

Vratislav

Pechota,

UNCITRAL

Arbitration Rules, in 3 WORLD ARBITRATION REPORTER 3083 (HANS SMIT & VRATISLAV
PECHOTA eds., 1987); Gerold Herrmann, UNCITRAL Conciliation and Arbitration
Rules, 55 ARB. 85 (1989).
64.
See generally B.W. Vigrass, The Rule of Institutions in Arbitration, in
RONALD BERNSTEIN, HANDBOOK OF ARBITRATION PRACTICE (1987).
65.
CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 2, at 796-801.

66.

See Ivan Szasz, Arbitration Rules and Practices of Institutions, in ICCA,

TENTH INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CONGRESS: PROCEEDINGS 38 (1990).

67.

Id.
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basis of an hourly fee. 68 According to recent statistics, the amount in
controversy in ICC arbitration exceeds $10 million in only twenty
percent of the submitted cases.6 9 Moreover, the ICC Court of
Arbitration exercises a quality control function over ICC awards that
can require ICC arbitrators to reconsider any award or part of a
ruling that appears dubious or ill-conceived to a majority of the 113member ICC Court of Arbitration.7 0 Arbitrators nonetheless remain
sovereign in reaching a final ruling.7 1 Finally, since the early 1920s
when it was founded to promote peace through prosperity, the ICC
has administered more than 12,500 arbitrations. 72 Its awards are
recognized throughout the world, and the parties benefit from the
ICC's long-standing reputation.
The expense of an international arbitration can be considerable,
especially when U.S.-style trial techniques become part of the
process. 73 Accordingly, a cost-benefit analysis should accompany the
choice of arbitral institution. The received wisdom is that ICC
74
arbitration is the most expensive form of transborder arbitration.
75
The ICC, however, contests that characterization,
arguing that a
lump sum paid at the outset of the proceeding is ultimately less costly
to the parties than the payment of an hourly rate, 76 as proceedings
77
often tend to last longer than is initially anticipated.
Also, institutional rules should be studied and compared to
determine which set of rules might better accommodate the needs of
the parties.7 8 Rules can be modified, adjusted, or combined to achieve
the best possible framework for the arbitration. Extensive
customization, however, can engender administrative difficulties.
Most arbitral institutions will apply the UNCITRAL Model Rules of

68.
See WILLIAM LAWRENCE CRAIG, WILLIAM PARK, & JAN PAULSSON,
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION (3d ed. 1999); Kenneth Rokison,

The London Court of International Arbitration, 55 ARB. 96 (1989); Adrian W.
Winstanley, The New Rules of the London Court of InternationalArbitration (LCIA), 8
AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 59 (1998).
69.
14-2 WORLD ARB. & MED. REP. 36 (2003).
70.
Id.

71.
Id.
72.
CRAIG ET AL., supra note 68, at 4-5.
73.
See DraftingInternationalArbitration Clauses, NEW JERSEY LAWYER, Feb.
1999, at 34.
74.
CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 2, at 797. In July 2003,
the ICC revised its rules relating to administrative expenses and arbitrator fees. Both
fee and expense rates were slightly increased. See 14-10 WORLD ARB. & MED. REP. 301
(2003).
75.
Lorraine Brennan, Esq., Director, Arbitration and ADR, North America,
ICC International Court of Arbitration, Lecture at Penn State The Dickinson School of
Law (Apr. 23, 2003).
76.
Id.
77.
78.

Id.
See KERR & SMIT, supra note 41.
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Arbitration or administer a "fast-track" arbitration process. 79 The
more complicated the reference to institutional arbitration, however,
the more difficult it is to negotiate or implement that part of the
agreement. Parties may prefer to make a simple choice and to trust in
the arbitral institution's professionalism and its ability to make
pragmatic adjustments when difficulties arise in the proceedings.
The allocation of costs and the provision for external
administration are vital to the legitimacy of domestic arbitration in
the employment, HMO, and consumer areas. Under the Cole8 0 and
Shankle81 holdings, the cost to the weaker, imposed-upon party
cannot act as a barrier or significant disincentive to have recourse to
82
arbitration. The U.S. Supreme Court, in its opinion in Green Tree,
appeared to place less of a premium on the effect of costs. In any
event, it placed the burden of proof in such instances squarely on the
complaining party's shoulders.8 3 In addition, pursuant to the holding
in the landmark Engalla opinion,8 4 hiring an external administrator
can insulate the arbitration from accusations of self-dealing conduct.
Such a practice is now requisite to avoid reversals or procedural
reformations by courts.

C. Selecting Arbitratorsand the Question of Impartiality
The selection of arbitrators8 5 is perhaps the most critical aspect
of any arbitration. Choosing the "right" arbitrators is instrumental to
the efficiency and effectiveness of the arbitration. The standard
agreement to arbitrate usually establishes a variety of mechanical
requirements in regard to the arbitrators: their number, the
procedure for appointing them, and how to select a presiding

79.
See generally Hans Smit, Fast-Track Arbitration,2 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 138
(1991) (for an explanation of "fast-track" arbitration).
80.
Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482-83 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
81.
Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1233-35 (10th
Cir. 1999).
82.
Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 82 (2000).
83.
Id. at 91-92.
84.
Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903, 909 (Cal. 1997).
85.
See generally Doak Bishop & Lucy Reed, Practical Guidelines for
Interviewing, Selecting and Challenging Party-Appointed Arbitrators in International
Commercial Arbitration, 14 ARB. INT'L 395 (1998); James H. Carter, The Selection of
Arbitrators, 5 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 84 (1994); Eric Robine, Le choix des arbitres, 1990
REV. ARB. 315; Murray L. Smith, Contractual Obligations Owed by and to Arbitrators:
Model Terms of Appointment, 8 ARB. INT'L 17 (1992); Thomas H. Webster, Selection of
Arbitrators in a Nutshell, 19 J. INT'L ARB. 261 (2002).

1210

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 36:1189

arbitrator if a tribunal is designated. 86 The contracting parties can
87
agree on other stipulations regarding the arbitrators.
The level of compensation is usually a matter to be negotiated
between the prospective arbitrator and the appointing party. The
administering arbitral institution can provide some supervision of
this aspect of the arbitration, especially if it has reason to believe that
the agreed upon arrangements might compromise the integrity or
legitimacy of the process. 8 8 In fact, the recently revised Rules of the
Swedish Arbitration Institute authorize the Institute to set the fees
for the arbitrators in accordance with the amount in dispute.8 9 The
purpose of the provision is to keep the fees within a reasonable
compensatory range and to prevent the process from being
undermined by unquestionable private agreements and greed.
Parties could also agree upon minimum qualifications for all
prospective arbitrators. 90 In an agreement for international
arbitration, the parties could provide that any arbitrator appointed
by the parties, the administering arbitral institution, or a court must
speak and read English or be trained in some fashion in U.S. law or
trial procedures. Party-designated arbitrators could be finally
confirmed by the administering institutions only if they meet the
agreed upon threshold requirements. The purpose of such
requirements would be to foster and increase the functionality of the
arbitral proceedings. Obviously, parties are free to agree to
requirements that might hamper the efficacy of proceedings but
foster some other design. These other requirements could reflect a
cultural or religious disposition that is fundamental to the appointing
party. A Muslim party, for example, might insist that all arbitrators
be male because an arbitral award rendered by a tribunal including a
female arbitrator is generally not enforceable in a Muslim country. 9 1
In a domestic arbitration, the requirement that at least one arbitrator
have legal training and expertise in civil rights litigation may be
essential to the legality of an employment arbitration proceeding
92
involving claims of unlawful discrimination.

86.
Carter, supra note 85, at 84-85.
87.
Webster, supra note 85 at 268-69 (for example, an arbitrator's technical or
legal expertise).
88.
J. Gillis Wetter, The Internationalization of International Arbitration:
Looking Ahead to the Next Ten Years, 11 ARB. INVL 117, 124 (1995).
89.
See CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 2, at 1181.
90.
See generally L.C. Bilow, The Professional Qualificationsof the Arbitrator,
6 INDIAN COUNcIL ARB. Q. 3 (1971); Ronald Fitch, Professionalism and Ethics of the
Arbitrator, 2 ARB. 97 (1983); Ulfk Nordenson, The Arbitral Tribunal, [1990] Y.B.
SWEDISH & INT'L ARB. 19; Frank J. Shelton, The Expertise of the Arbitrator, 3 ARB. 5
(1984); B.W. Vigrass, Arbitrators-Selectionand Training,47 ARB. 112 (1981).
91.
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
92.
See CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 2, at 558.
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A clearly controversial matter that has arisen recently in arbitral
practice relates directly to the selection of arbitrators and to their
qualifications. The major arbitral institutions, supported by a dated
U.S. Supreme Court ruling 9 3 and professional lawyers associations
(i.e., the IBA),94 have taken the position that all arbitrators should be
impartial. 95 The tradition in prior practice had been to require only
that the presiding arbitrator (the "neutral" arbitrator) be fully
impartial. There was an expectation that party-designated
arbitrators would be sympathetic to the position of the appointing
party and would favor that position in the deliberations. This practice
often created "arbitrations within arbitrations," in which the neutral
arbitrator resolved the disagreement between the two partyappointed arbitrators. 96 Some prominent international lawyers, who
specialize in transborder commercial litigation and arbitration,
argued that this quid pro quo was generally not in effect. 97 In their
view, international arbitrators are people of high integrity and

93.
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150 (1968).
94.
See IBA ETHICS FOR INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATORS, rule 4 (2000).
95.
See Pierre Bellet, Des arbitres neutres et non-neutres, in CHRISTIAN
DOMINICE & PIERRE LALIRE, ETUDES DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL EN L'HONNEUR DE
PIERRE LALIVE 399 (1993); MARC HENRY, LE DEVOIR D'INDEPENDENCE DE L'ARBITRE
(2001); INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE ARBITRAL PROCESS AND THE
INDEPENDENCE OF ARBITRATORS (1991); INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE
STATUS OF THE ARBITRATOR: SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT (1995); Hamid Andaloussi, The
Arbitrator'sIndependence, 3 ICC INT'L CT. ARB. BULL. 43, 43-44 (1992); J. Loni Bader,
Arbitrator Disclosure-Probingthe Issues, J. INT'L ARB. 39, Sept. 1995, at 39, 42; Aldo
Berlinguer, Impartiality and Independence of Arbitrators in InternationalPractice, 6
AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 339, 339 (1995); Stephen R. Bond, The Selection of ICC Arbitrators
and the Requirement of Independence, 4 ARB. INT'L 300, 301 (1988); James T. Carter,

Improving Life with the Party-Appointed Arbitrator: Clearer Conduct Guidelines for
'Nonneutrals', 11 AM. REV. INT'L ARB, 295, 299 (2000); Donald E. Zubrod, Evident
Partialityand Misconduct of Arbitrators, J. INT'L ARB., June 1994, at 115, 117-18. See
also Laurence Shore, Disclosure and Impartiality, 57 DIsP. RES. J., Feb.-April 2002, at
32, 34.
96.
See Martin Domke, The Arbitrator's Duty to Disclose, [1969] J. BUS. L. 162,
163 (1969); see generally Fred6ric Eisemann, The Arbitrator's Independence, 6 INDIAN
COUNCIL ARB. Q. 5 (1971); Fred6ric Eisemann, The PartisanArbitrator, 4 INDIAN
COUNCIL ARB. Q. 3 (1969).
97.
LAWRENCE NEWMAN, A Practitioner'sObservations on the Resolution of
International Commercial Disputes, in LEx MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION: A
DISCUSSION OF THE NEW LAW MERCHANT 5-6 (Thomas E. Carbonneau, ed., rev. ed.

1998). See also de Fina, The Party Appointed Arbitrator in InternationalArbitrationRole and Selection, 15 ARB. INT'L 381, 386 (1999). The revised ABA Code of Ethics for
Arbitrators in Domestic and Commercial Disputes mandates that all arbitrators, even
those appointed by a party to the dispute, act with impartiality. See
http://www.abanet.org/dispute/commercial-disputes.pdf. For a different perspective,
see JCI Communications, Inc. v. Int'l Broth. of Elec. Workers, Local 103, 324 F.3d 42
(lst Cir. 2003); Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All Am. Life Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 617 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1754 (2003).
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accomplishment and rule in an independent manner. 98 Nevertheless,

the received wisdom was that each party wanted "their man or
person" on the tribunal. 99

Prominent players in the arbitral community now advocate for
complete impartiality in all the arbitrators who are seated on a
panel. 10 0 A failure to comply with this standard could result in the
forced recusal of a party-appointed arbitrator, an action for the
disqualification of the arbitrator, having the arbitral institution or a
court appoint a substitute arbitrator, or the bringing of a challenge to
the legitimacy of the arbitration or of the arbitral award. 1 1 Parties,
however, may want to have the more traditional type of partyappointed arbitrators in their arbitration. They could, therefore,
provide in the arbitration agreement that each party shall have an
unqualified right to name their own arbitrator and that partydesignated arbitrators are subject to recusal or disqualification only if
it is established that they engaged in corrupt behavior, e.g., taking a
bribe. A more ambitious stipulation might further provide that: "A
special relationship can apply between an arbitrator and the
designating party as long as that relationship is disclosed and does
not denature the arbitrator's judgment or conduct in the actual
proceedings." Such a stipulation would bring the parties' agreement
directly into conflict with the practice recommended by major arbitral
10 2
institutions and endorsed by some courts.
If the conflict is evident at the time of a demand for arbitration,
the arbitral institution may either waive its right to object or refuse
to administer the arbitration, especially if it believes it is not able to
comply with the stipulations in the parties' agreement. 10 3 In the
highly competitive business of providing arbitral services, a refusal to
administer arbitrations on this basis may not be forthcoming.
Further, it could place both the parties and the arbitral institution in
untenable and impractical positions. The circumstances have the
trappings of an irreconcilable conflict that demands a choice (perhaps
a false one) between the legitimacy of the arbitral process and the
exercise of party freedom of contract. Both factors are instrumental to
arbitration and neither can be sacrificed without significantly
undermining the process. A court could choose, but its decisional
mission would be equally "impossible": it must rule either that the
process has been suspect or corrupt all along or that the parties' right

98.
NEWMANN, supra note 97, at 5.
99.
Id.
100.
See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
101.
Id.
102.
I have referred to these circumstances as conflicts among sovereign parties
in the arbitral process. See Carbonneau, supra note 12, at 814 (discussing conflicts
between sovereign parties).
103.
Id.
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to configure the manner of their arbitration is nonexistent in these
circumstances.
Moreover, what happens if the courts are divided on the "right"
outcome? Does the prior practice of appointing partisan or
sympathetic arbitrators reflect corruption or common sense? Will
arbitration be undermined by a less than absolute form of
impartiality? Why is the neutral's decisive neutrality not sufficient? If
complete, tribunal-wide impartiality is the rule, why should the
parties designate arbitrators? Should not the arbitral institution or a
court perform this function as another means of guaranteeing the
impartiality of the tribunal? Would not party acquiescence be
sufficient to ward off the taint of illegitimacy in more traditional
circumstances? Why are disclosure, waiver, and party agreement not
enough in this situation?
The failure of agreement between the institution and the parties
on this matter can paralyze the recourse to arbitration in the specific
transactional circumstance. A failure to address the problem or the
institution's acquiescence to the parties' desires could imperil the
enforceability of the award by the courts in a requested jurisdiction.
The law of the jurisdiction could provide that the designation of
party-appointed arbitrators violates the jurisdiction's public policy
because such arbitrations are not legitimate forms of adjudication. If
the arbitral institution forces the appointment of neutral arbitrators,
the deviation from the parties' agreement could also threaten the
enforceability of the award. On one hand, including the right to
appoint party arbitrators in the agreement is one of the most effective
ways to maintain the parties' freedom of contract within arbitration.
On the other hand, it can become a means of undermining the
enforceability of the award and the practical operation of the process.
A dilemma is emerging. It has no clear or easy solution. It posits
a truly impossible choice. It is difficult to advocate for the restriction
of contract freedom when there is no demonstrated history of corrupt
conduct by party-designated arbitrators. The arbitral institutions
have thus far failed to show the need to revamp established practice.
Rules of full disclosure and the acceptance of the quid pro quo by the
arbitrating parties appear historically to have constituted sufficient
protection against possible abuse. Unless there are special
circumstances and needs, there would be little justification for threemember arbitral tribunals if all arbitrators were truly neutral. A rule
of full neutrality would eventually eliminate the parties' authority to
appoint arbitrators and would shift it to an external and disinterested
party. The new institutional practice may be aimed at the attainment
of other objectives, namely, reinforcing the public perception that the
arbitral process has integrity and operates in a flawless professional
manner. In the light of public scrutiny, it would or might be difficult
to defend the quid pro quo of past practice on the appointment of

1214

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 36:1189

party arbitrators. Allowing each party to weight the tribunal in its

favor flies in the face of fairness and evenhandedness. The greater
contemporary scope and range of arbitration may demand an
alteration of past practices and the emergence of a (self-) regulatory
predicate.
D. ArbitratorAccountability and Collegiality
There are at least two other matters that relate to the selection
of arbitrators which can be addressed in the arbitration agreement.
First, the parties could endeavor to set standards relating to
arbitrators' professional accountability or malpractice.1 0 4 The
inclusion of such a provision is likely to be as unrealistic as it is
unfortunate. Arbitrators under U.S. law, like judges, are held to be
immune from suit for their adjudicatory conduct.' 0 5 In other national
jurisdictions generally, arbitrators can be held liable only for reckless
professional conduct. 10 6 Attempts to modify these decisional and
statutory rules by contract into a larger and more standard form of
professional liability are likely to result in the impossibility of
securing a person who is willing to serve as an arbitrator. Prospective
arbitrators are extremely unlikely to surrender their immunity from
professional liability.
Lack of arbitrator accountability,10 7 however, continues to
frustrate (and endanger) parties. For many commercial parties, the
decisional and professional sovereignty of the arbitrator can readily
transform the arbitrator into a dictator and the arbitration into an
instrument of oppression. There are few, if any, external restraints on
the arbitrator.' 0 8 This factor, coupled with the general lack of
vigorous judicial supervision, makes the arbitrator omnipotent and
the parties completely subject to the arbitrator's exercise of
judgment. 0 9 There seems to be little choice but to trust the arbitrator
and to hope for the best (or at least to avoid the worst) or to place
some type of (other) limitation upon the arbitrators-possibly
providing for the return of fees in certain circumstances.

104.
For information about arbitrator liability, see generally Bristow, supra note
42; Juan Antonio Cremades, Should Arbitrators Be Immune from Liability?, 10 INT'L
FIN. L. REV. 32 (1991); Philippe Fouchard, Le statut de l'arbitredans la jurisprudence
franqaise, 1996 REV. ARB. 325; Susan D. Franck, Liability of InternationalArbitrators:
A Comparative Analysis and Proposalfor Qualified Immunity, 20 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 1 (2000); Andrew T. Guzman, ArbitratorLiability: Reconciling Arbitration
and Mandatory Rules, 49 DUKE L.J. 1279 (2000); Andrea Mettler, Immunity v.
Liability in Arbitral Adjudication, 47 ARB. J. 24 (1992).
105.
See generally THE IMMUNITY OF ARBITRATORS (Julian D.M. Lew ed., 1990).
106.
Id.
107.
Id.
108.
Id.
109.
Id.
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Second, contracting parties could focus upon the need for
collegiality among the arbitrators. One of the objectives in appointing
arbitrators is to achieve expertise in the decision making body that
will rule on the parties' disputes." 0 Parties may also want a panel
that is representative of the differences among them or that creates
some form of neutrality with respect to those differences."' Whatever
the parties' other aims, appointing a group of decision-makers who
can work well together may be the most critical objective of all.
Arbitrators who can work as a "team" are likely to be able to resolve
difficult problems that arise during the arbitration. The lack of a
collegial disposition among the members of the tribunal will create
delay and increase the cost of the proceedings and eventually could
imperil the enforceability of the award. Misunderstandings and
miscommunications are especially likely in transborder arbitrations
where cultural, linguistic, and professional training differences can
entail substantial conflicts in approach and disagreements as to the
proper conduct and direction of the proceedings," 2 The dichotomy of
training between U.S. common-law lawyers and continental
European civil-law lawyers is only one illustration among many of the
substantial differences that can exist between international
lawyers." 3 The U.S. trial format is relatively unique among national
trial systems; in particular, it gives the parties a large and active role
in creating the record of the matter through discovery and a right to
cross-examine witnesses. The European civilian trial system
attributes nearly autocratic power to judges in the conduct of the
proceeding, the creation of a non-verbatim record, and the hearing of
witnesses.11 4 The rules of evidence are few in number and generally
afford presiding judges wide discretion.

110.
Stephen K. Huber, The Role of Arbitrator: Conflict of Interest, 28 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 915, 917 (2001) ("Individuals are commonly chosen as arbitrators precisely
because ... they are the leading experts in the industry").
111.
See, e.g., Giorgio Bernini, Cultural Neutrality: A Prerequisite to Arbitral
Justice, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 39, 40 (1989); Gabriel M. Wilner, Acceptance of Arbitration by
Developing Countries, in
RESOLVING
TRANSNATIONAL
DISPUTES
THROUGH
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 283, 283-91 (Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., 1984); see
generally CONFLICTING LEGAL CULTURES IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: OLD ISSUES AND
NEW TRENDS (Stefan N. Frommel & Barry A.K. Rider eds., 1999).
112.
See Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Adjudication: A Comparative
Assessment of Its Remedial and Substantive Status in Transnational Commerce, 19
TEX. INVL L. J. 33, 59 (1984); Steven J. Stein & Daniel R. Wetman, International
Commercial Arbitration in the 1980s: A Comparison of the Major Systems and Rules, 38
Bus. LAW. 1685, 1697 (1983). See also INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION: NATIONAL REPORTS, BASIC LEGAL TEXTS (Pieter Sanders & A. Jan van
den Berg eds., 1984).
113.
Carbonneau, supra note 112, at 59.
114.
See generally H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD:
SUSTAINABLE DIVERSITY IN LAW (2000); HENRY P. DEVRIES, CIVIL LAW FOR THE ANGLOAMERICAN LAWYER (1979).
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As a consequence, transborder arbitrations often involve debates
about the choice of trial procedure. Although the absence of a jury
argues strongly for activist arbitrators and fewer rules of evidence,
controversy generally emerges about the level of party participation
in evidence gathering and whether the rules of procedure will include
the right to name and to cross-examine witnesses. 115 Disagreements
about the proper approach to trial procedures can substantially
complicate the negotiations that pertain to the arbitration agreement
and could thereby undermine the transaction. Recently, civil-law
lawyers have argued that some choices as to the arbitral trial cannot
even be entertained if the fairness of the process is to be
maintained. 116 Because U.S. common-law lawyers are trained
extensively in matters of cross-examination (as well as discovery), the
inclusion of these devices in the arbitral trial places the Latin
American, European, or Asian civil-law lawyer at an inherent and
irreducible disadvantage.
Some of these considerations raise "imponderable" questions.
There are few, if any, bridges between the divergent attributes of the
various legal traditions. 117 It is as difficult to reconcile these different
approaches to law and procedural fairness as it is to develop full
fluency in several different languages and cultures. The general
practice is to leave the adjustment of such differences to the
administering arbitral institution and primarily to the sitting
arbitrators." 8 The arbitrators, however, may not be able to reach
suitable accommodations if they are not able to be collegial among
themselves.
The domestic arbitration process raises another set of
considerations on this matter. The relative homogeneity of national
culture generates fewer conflicts as to basic approach. The
composition, integrity, and collegiality of the arbitral tribunal become
more significant when the domestic arbitral proceeding takes place

115.
See, e.g., Marcus S. Jacobs, The Adversarial v. Inquisitorial Principles of
Dispute Resolution Within the Context of International Commercial Arbitration,
MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP., Dec. 2001, at 46.
116.
Id.
117.
See, e.g., GLENN, supra note 114, at 56-83.
118.
National laws on arbitration and institutional arbitration rules, including
the UNCITRAL model version of them, generally establish a hierarchy of authority in
arbitration under which the parties have the first opportunity to decide, followed by
the arbitrators and (perhaps) the arbitral institution. A court can resolve conflicts in
the process directly or by confirming the decisions of the arbitrators or the
administering institution. In certain exceptional circumstances (for instance, relating
to the conduct of the arbitral proceedings or the establishment by the state of
mandatory rules of arbitration law-as in the French Code of Civil Procedure
provisions on arbitration or the 1996 U.K. law of arbitration), the arbitrators may have
first authority to rule. See generally CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note
2, ch.13.
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between parties of different economic strength"19 or when it involves
120
rulings upon civil rights issues or other political matters.
Weighting the composition of the tribunal in one direction or the
other compromises the integrity of the process. Appointing generally
neutral arbitrators who can work together to achieve a fair hearing
and produce an even-handed ruling may represent the best approach
to such problems. Achieving that objective, however, is always easier
said than done.
E. ControllingAuthority in the Arbitration
Another, related dimension of the arbitration that should be
addressed in the arbitration agreement is which entity should have
controlling authority in the proceeding: the administering arbitral
institution, the arbitrating parties, or the arbitrators. Traditionally,
practice provides the basic guidance on this matter following the rule
that "unless the parties provide otherwise, the arbitrators shall
decide ....,1121 This pragmatic balance between freedom of contract
and the authority of the arbitrators has been, and may continue to be,
a sufficient hierarchy of authority. In circumstances in which
irreconcilable positions develop between the three principal players in
the process, however, such as those pertaining to the matter of
impartiality, the well-settled hierarchy may be inadequate to resolve
the conflict.' 22 Party provisions in these circumstances would at least
emphasize the importance and argue for the controlling authority of
contract in the resolution of these conflicts. Courts may not support,
and arbitral institutions may not yield, to that principle of
determination.
A clash of authority between the sovereign players in the
arbitration process can readily be illustrated by the facts of an actual
case. 123 A ship-owner entered into a contract with the owner of a

119.
The composition and appointment of the arbitral tribunal or the
designation of the sole arbitrator are critical when there is a disparity of position
among the parties. Such circumstances generally prevail in both employer and
consumer arbitration. Weighting the tribunal can either offset or exacerbate the
disparity. Establishing the evenhandedness of the process is instrumental to its
legitimacy and the binding force of its determinations. See generally CARBONNEAU,
CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 2, at 374-424, 466-562.
120.
This aspect of the process is best illustrated by the settlements that were
reached in the Smith Barney and Merrill Lynch class action litigations. See
CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 2, at 558.

121.
See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolf, 531 U.S. 79, 891-92 (2000).
122.
See Carbonneau, supranote 12, at 818.
123.
I am grateful to Professor Cindy Galway Buys of South Illinois University
School of Law for bringing this case to my attention and for supplying me with a
description of the facts of the case. I have altered the facts slightly to maintain the
confidentiality of the matter.
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shipyard for the repair of a vessel. Unassisted by counsel, the parties
adapted a variety of provisions from form contracts. They agreed to
arbitrate disputes, and stipulated that the arbitrators would apply
English maritime law. The reference to arbitration was essentially
dictated by the customary practice in the trade, and the choice of
English law reflected the parties' awareness that the English legal
system has long-standing experience in maritime matters. The
parties further provided that the arbitration would take place in
Houston, Texas. The arbitrators would be both technical and legal
experts. They would all be U.S. nationals.
After a dispute arose and the arbitration began, counsel for the
shipyard owner argued that the arbitrators should apply U.S. federal
maritime law, not English law. The arbitral tribunal heard
arguments on the issue and eventually ruled that it would apply U.S.
law. The tribunal reasoned that that law was more accessible to itself
and the parties, its application obviated the need to appoint and hear
experts, it would facilitate the ruling, and it had not been
convincingly established that the choice of law was outcomedeterminative. The case settled prior to the rendition of any award on
the merits.
The circumstances indicate a clear decisional departure by the
arbitrators from the express terms of the agreement. There was no
mutuality of agreement between the parties that permitted the terms
of the original agreement on this matter to be modified. The
arbitrators, however, were vested with adjudicatory power. They
appear to have decided that it was in the best interest of the
arbitration that the provision for the governing law be altered. Their
determination made practical sense and was the result of considered
deliberations, although it manifestly contradicted the terms of the
parties' initial bargain. Application of Article V(I)(d) of the New York
Arbitration Convention, however, would likely result in the non1 24
enforcement of any eventual award.
Can arbitrators adapt and adjust the terms of the arbitration
agreement during the arbitration to achieve the ends of justice or to
facilitate the process and make the proceedings more functional? Do
not the arbitrators in fact have a professional duty 125 to make the
proceedings work at optimal capacity? Should such modifications be
admissible only if the parties agree in some fashion? Must the
administering arbitral institution be consulted? Why should the
arbitrators prevail in these circumstances and rule with absolute
authority?

124.
In particular, under Article V(1)(c) or (d) or, possibly, Article V(2)(b).
125.
On the professional duties and obligations of the arbitrators, see generally
D.J. Sharp, The Arbitrator'sDuty of Good Faith,66 ARB. 226 (2000); Murray L. Smith,
Contractual Obligations Owed by and to Arbitrator: Model Terms of Appointment, 8
ARB. INT'L 17, 26 (1992).
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F. GoverningLaw
A workable and contemporary arbitration agreement should also
include a provision that clearly establishes the governing law 126 and

the role it is to play as to the different facets of the transaction and
the agreed upon process of dispute resolution. Such a provision could
provide the parties and a supervising court with both clarity and
direction in difficult circumstances. The parties could choose a law to
govern the interpretation of the contract (including the arbitration
agreement) and the merits of any dispute that might arise under the
contract. They could also decide that the agreement to arbitrate is
governed by a separate law. They could designate yet another law to
regulate any subsequent arbitration and its proceedings. Such a
designation should endeavor to accommodate the law designated to
govern the arbitration and the law of the place of arbitration (the socalled lex loci arbitri).127 It should also define the significance of the
arbitration rules of the administering arbitral institution, especially
as they relate to the chosen law and the law of the place of
arbitration. The U.S. Supreme Court has attributed some type of
legal standing to the rules of arbitral institutions. 128 As incredible as
that position may seem, the parties need to address it and deal with
it in a way that protects and even advances their interests.
Choice-of-law considerations may have greater relevance to
transborder arbitrations. There, the problem of "lawlessness" is
particularly acute. In this setting, distinguishing between the law of
the contract, the adjudication, and the place of arbitration may be
critical. 129 Obviously, in some jurisdictions, law may trump

126.
See, e.g., OKEZIE CHUKWUMERIJE, CHOICE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 34-35 (1994); PETER NYGH, CHOICE OF FORUM AND LAWS IN
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 13 (1997); Filip De Ly, The Place of

Arbitration in the Conflict of Laws of International Commercial Arbitration: An
Exercise in ArbitrationPlanning, 12 Nw. J. INT'L L. BUS. 48, 69-70 (1948); Ole Lando,
The Law Applicable to the Merits of the Dispute, 2 ARB. INT'L 104, 107 (1986). See
generally Marc Blessing, The Law Applicable to the Arbitration Clause and
Arbitrability, in IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND
AWARDS 168 (A. Jan van den Berg ed., 1999); Julian D.M. Lew, Applicable Law in
Commercial Arbitration, 47 ARB. 92 (1981); Michael Pryles, Choice of Law Issues in
InternationalArbitration, 63 ARB. 200 (1997); Ian Rhidian, Proper Law of Arbitration
Agreements, [1984] LLOYD'S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 304.

127.

See generally William P. Park, The Lex Loci Arbitri and International

Commercial Arbitration, 32 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 21 (1983).
128.
See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 63 (1995)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
129.
The failure to do so could result in the application of an unexpected law by
a court the jurisdictional authority of which was equally unanticipated. The outcome of
the agreement to arbitrate could be equally surprising and could frustrate the parties'
initial intent as to dispute resolution. It could also engender a paralysis of remedies
through the conflict of jurisdiction and of judgments. See generally HORACIO A.
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contract.13 0 Therefore, party provision may not be controlling. Also,
the distinctions may be too complicated and, as a result, may become
unworkable or pathological. Their intricacy could overwhelm the
possibility of practical implementation. Allowing arbitrators to decide
these matters on an ad hoc basis may be a functional alternative to
party provision. The reference to the application of a more universal,
transborder law represents another possibility that can be combined
with arbitrator discretion. The parties can select the lex
3 2
the CISG, 133 the
mercatoria,l3 1 the lex mercatoria arbitralis,1
3
4
UNIDROIT Principles, or the UNCITRAL frameworks 13 5 to govern
the arbitration.
These considerations exemplify the conundrum associated with
the attempt of the contracting parties to anticipate difficulties in the
transaction and to establish the delegation of authority that occurs
when problems arise. The contracting parties must make their
choices at the outset of the transaction and in the abstract. Once a
dispute arises, their ability to agree is more painstaking and can be
significantly minimized. The arbitrators are in a better position to
make determinations as problems arise, and it is their task to make
the proceedings work. In addressing the problems, however, the

GRIGERA

NAON,

CHOICE-OF-LAw

PROBLEMS

IN

INTERNATIONAL

COMMERCIAL

ARBITRATION (1992); Marie Garavaglia, In Search of the Proper Law in Transnational
Commercial Disputes, 12 N.Y. L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 29 (1991); Hans Smit, ANational Arbitration, 63 TUL. L. REV. 629 (1989); Georgou Zekas, Problems of
Applicable Law in Commercial and Maritime Arbitration, 16 J. INT'L ARB. 173 (1999);
Barena van Niekerk, Aspects of Proper Law, CurialLaw and InternationalCommercial
Arbitration, 2 SOUTH AFR. MERCANTILE L.J. 117 (1990).
130.
See generally, e.g., GUIDITTA MOSS CORDERO, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION: PARTY AUTONOMY AND MANDATORY RULES (1999).

131.
See, e.g., LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION: A DISCUSSION OF THE NEW
LAW MERCHANT, supra note 97; Emmanuel Gaillard, Transnational Law: A Legal
System or a Method of Decision Making?, 17 ARB. INT'L 59, 60 (2001); Ning Jin, The
Status of Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration, 7 AM. REV. INT'L
ARB. 163, 164 (1996); Vanessa Wilkinson, The New Lex Mercatoria-Reality or
Academic Fantasy?, J. INT'L ARB., June 1995, at 103, 106. See generally Michael
Freeman, Lex Mercatoria: Its Emergence and Acceptance As a Legal Basis for the
Resolution of InternationalDisputes, [1997] ARB. & DISP. RES. L.J. 281.
132.
See, e.g., Hans Smit, Proper Choice of Law and the Lex Mercatoria
Arbitralis, in LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION: A DISCUSSION OF THE NEW LAW
MERCHANT, supra note 97, at 93.

133.
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods (CISG), Apr. 11, 1980, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 97/18, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 671
(1980). See H. VAN HOUTTE, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE ch. 4 (2d ed. 2002).
134.
See, e.g., Michael J. Bonell, UNIDROIT Principlesand Lex Mercatoria, in
LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION, supra note 97, at 249.
See generally, Gerold Herrmann, The UNCITRAL Model Law on
135.
International Commercial Arbitration:Introduction and General Provisions, in ESSAYS
ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 3 (Peter Sarcevic ed., 1989); Michael F.
Hoellering, The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 20
INT'L LAW. 327, 329 (1986); Pieter Sanders, Procedures and Practice under the
UNCITRAL Rules, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 453, 453 (1979).
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arbitrators may not decide the matter as the parties might have
decided it prior to the finalization of the contract; they may not be
able to follow the parties' instructions because of practical
considerations; or they may have-or may believe they have-a better
solution than the one provided for by the parties. The decision to act
in accordance with any one of these variations could compromise
either the functionality of the arbitral proceeding or its lawful
character. The question centers upon how valuable the party right to
decide may be, how much protection against arbitrator discretion is
warranted for party rights, and what value is placed upon the
practical effectiveness of the procedure.
G. The Characterof the Arbitral Trial
The arbitration agreement can also establish the structure and
content of the arbitral trial and the remedial and procedural powers
of the arbitrators. 136 In either circumstance, party provision can act
as either a substitute for, an amendment to, or a replacement of
otherwise applicable institutional rules. As to matters of procedure,
an extensive list of elements should be considered, including the use
of discovery and other pre-hearing devices in the arbitration, rules for
the gathering and assessment of evidence, the qualification and use of
experts in the proceeding, the calling and questioning of witnesses,
the powers and obligations of the parties during the proceeding, and a
statement of who retains decisive authority in the procedure. The
arbitrators' authority as to the issuance of interim relief, the conduct
of the proceedings, the predicate of decision, and the type and amount
of damages should be defined. Also, provision needs to be made for
addressing procedural matters that arise in the "twilight" period that
follows the demand for arbitration and the appointment of the
arbitrators. Critical issues can surface at this stage of the process,
having a direct bearing upon the effectiveness of the arbitration. The
applicable institutional rules may already regulate these matters.
The parties should determine whether these provisions are suitable
for their arbitration.

136.

See generally UNCITRAL

NOTES ON ORGANIZING

AN

INTERNATIONAL

ARBITRATION PROCEEDING. See generally Marc Blessing, The ICC Arbitration Process.
Part III: The Procedure Before the Arbitral Tribunal, 3 ICC INT'L CT. ARB. BULL. 18
(1992); S. Goekjian, The Conduct of InternationalArbitration, 11 LAW. AM. 409 (1979);
Sigrard Jarvin, The Arbitral Proceeding, 1999 STOCKHOLM ARB. REP. 43; Jacques
Pellerin, Les droits des parties dans linstance arbitrale, 1990 REV. ARB. 395; Hans
Smit, Managing an InternationalArbitration:An Arbitrator's View, 5 AM. REV. INT'L
ARB. 129 (1994).
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H. The Award
In constructing their agreement, there are two elements that the
parties should consider in regard to the award. 137 First, the parties
should determine whether they want the arbitrators to rule in a
summary manner or articulate reasons for their determinations. The
reasons can be brief and grounded in technical expertise or can
approximate the more elaborate content of a judicial decision.
Summary rulings are seen as a disincentive to overly aggressive
judicial supervision and as a means of preserving the economy of the
process. 138 Giving reasons for the result, however, achieves a number
of equally important objectives. For example, it demands that the
arbitrators "think out" their conclusions by addressing the content of
the applicable law, the arguments advanced by the parties, and
possibly the principles that regulate the exercise of arbitrator
authority. 139 The provision of reasons also gives the losing party an
explanation for the result. Achieving these objectives may enhance
the legitimacy of the specific determination and generally of the
process. It may also enhance voluntary compliance with or the
judicial enforcement of the award. Finally, it might contribute to the
development of a substantive transborder law of commerce, contract,
and arbitration.
I. The Standardof Review
Second, in some jurisdictions, the courts have recognized the
contract authority of parties to prescribe the standard of judicial
review that would apply to prospective awards. 140 This development
14 1 It
emerged and has been debated in the U.S. federal circuits.

137.
See, e.g., Marcel Fontaine, Drafting the Award: A Perspective from a Civil
Law Jurist, 5 ICC INT'L CT. ARB. BULL. 30, 31, 35 (1994); Humphrey Lloyd, Writing
Awards: A Common Lawyer's Perspective, 5 ICC INT'L CT. ARB. BULL. 38 (1994);
Michael O'Reilly & Eleni Sfakianaki, Arbitral Awards: Contents, Requirements and
Layout, 66 ARB. 79, 80 (2000); Margaret P. Sullivan, The Scope of Modern Arbitral
Awards, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1113, 1122 (1988).
Sullivan, supra note 137, at 1120.
138.
139.
Id.
140.
See CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 2, at 24.
141.
See Lapine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 888-89 (9th
Cir. 1997). But see Kyocera v. Prudential Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 2003 WL 22025130
(9th Cir. Aug. 29, 2003) (reversing prior holding and ruling that the FAA controls
judicial supervision of awards); see also Gateway Tech., Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp.,
64 F.3d 993, 997 (5th Cir. 1995); New England Utils. (NEU) v. Hydro-Quebec, 10 F.
Supp. 2d 53, 60 (D. Mass. 1998); Cook v. Hughes Training, Inc., 254 F.3d 588, 593 (5th
Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1196 (2002); Roadway Package System, Inc. v.
Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 292-93 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 545 (2001); Bowen
v. Amoco Pipeline Corp., 254 F.3d 925, 921 (10th Cir. 2001). But see Chicago
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received a mixed reception
in those courts; some circuits enforce these
"opt-in" provisions 142 for judicial review, others do not. Through this
use of the arbitration agreement, the statutory standard for
effectuating the judicial supervision of arbitral awards becomes a
default provision. 143 The controlling legal rule is the standard stated
in the contract. 144 In the actual cases, the parties stipulate that the
court at the place of enforcement must review the merits of any legal
determination reached by the arbitrators. The practice demanded by
the contract obviously contradicts the core objective of the statutory
scheme, namely, to exclude any merits-based review of arbitral
awards, and demands that regulation defer to the parties' freedom of
contract. It also strongly implies a distrust of the arbitrators'
decisional ability. Further, it reduces arbitration to a fact-finding
function. Nevertheless, some courts-of both liberal and conservative
political persuasions-find such stipulations enforceable for reasons
145
of contract freedom.
To some extent, the emergence of this development in arbitral
practice testifies to the growing sophistication of the arbitral process
as a mechanism for domestic and transborder dispute resolution. It
also demonstrates the fragility of a doctrine ("the strong judicial
policy favoring arbitration"'1 46) that is founded more on achieving
preordained and uniform results than it is on intellectually
sustainable reasoning and principles. Whatever the larger doctrinal
implications may be, the drafter of arbitration agreements has a new
task: to decide whether to use such a provision and, if so, to
determine where it is likely to be enforceable.
"Opt-in" provisions for judicial review also raise the question of
whether the newly discovered authority of contract can be applied in
reverse to achieve an opposite result. In other words, would courts
hospitable to freedom of contract in arbitration uphold, favor, merely
tolerate, or reject the parties' elimination of any judicial supervision

Typographical Union v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501, 1505 (7th Cir. 1991).

See also Victoria Holstein, Co-opting The Federal Judiciary:ContractualExpansion of
Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 1 J. AM. ARB. 127, 130 (2002); Alan S. Rau,

'Arbitrability"And JudicialReview: A Brief Rejoinder, 1 J. AM. ARB 159, 160-61 (2002).
The most recent pronouncement on this issue is Schoch v. Infoura, Inc., 341 F.3d 785
(8th Cir. 2003). Refining its prior ruling in UHC Management Co., the court states that
the parties' intent to have judicial de novo review must be clear and unmistakable. Id.
142.
The phrase is from the Uniform Arbitration Act, available at
http://www.law.upenn.edufbll/ulc/uarba/arbitrat1213.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2003).
143.
Id.
144.
Id.
145.
See e.g., Lapine Technology, 130 F.3d at 889; Cook, 254 F.3d at 594. But see
Kyocera v. Prudential Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 997 (9th Cir. 2003).
146.
See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
624-25 (1985) (finding a strong presumption favoring arbitration in international
commerce).
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of the awards emanating from their arbitration? In such
circumstances, the parties would be seeking to establish the
automatic enforcement of awards by -the courts of any requested
jurisdiction. Such an approach currently only applies to ICSID
arbitral awards. 147 Instead of court scrutiny, the ICSID arbitral
procedure provides access to a second ICSID arbitral tribunal
through an annulment action. The procedure has been agreed upon
by treaty. 148 The Dutch law on arbitration also forecloses the judicial
supervision of awards if appellate reference is made to a second
149
arbitral tribunal.
There are a host of legal and practical problems that attend the
implementation and assessment of the "opt-in" judicial review
provisions. Trumping the statute by contract raises a question of
basic authority and legality. Also, contract is used to establish the
principle and scope of judicial jurisdiction. Moreover, court
supervision on the merits runs counter to the entire modern history of
legislation on arbitration. 150 These threshold problems are followed
by equally significant difficulties of implementation. What result if
the designated or otherwise ruling court rejects the contract
reference? Is review on the merits foreclosed or can another court
undertake the task? What standards of review should a reviewing
court apply? Does it apply arbitral or judicial standards, for instance?
Can the court modify an award on the basis of its authority to review
the merits? The best approach may be to allow for the judicial
supervision of the merits of awards by another arbitral tribunal, as is
151
done under the aforementioned Dutch law.
J. The Chromalloy Problem
Another danger that arises in transborder arbitration results
from the decision in Chromalloy v. Egypt.152 The parties, however,
may be unable to lessen the consequences of that opinion in their
agreement to arbitrate. Chromalloy achieved an enforcement result
that favored recourse to arbitration. 153 The federal court held that the
setting aside of an international arbitral award in the place of its
rendition by local courts did not thwart the award's enforceability in
another requested jurisdiction under the New York Arbitration

147.

See CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 2, at 912, 924-25

(describing the ICSID arbitration procedure).
148.
Id.
149.
See Netherlands: New Statute on Arbitration, 26 I.L.M. 921, 940 (1987)
(describing the Dutch law on arbitration).
150.
See CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 2; see also list of cases
discussed, supra note 141 (offering a modern history of judicial review).
151.
Netherlands: New Statute on Arbitration, 26 I.L.M. at 940.
152.
Chromalloy v. Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907, 908 (D.D.C. 1996).
153.
Id. at 913-14.
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Convention. 154 In granting enforcement, the court held that the
Article V grounds for assessing international arbitral awards were
stated in conditional language and were, therefore, optional. 155 Also,
international regimes for arbitration and award enforcement could
not compromise domestic rights that prevailed in regard to
arbitration. 156 The nullified award was enforceable under the first
chapter of the FAA.
A subsequent federal court ruling (Spier157) declined to follow
Chromalloy. Chromalloy, however, is joined by French courts'
decisions achieving the same result.'58 Despite its pro-arbitration
result, Chromalloy makes the enforcement of international arbitral
awards more difficult because it transforms the basis for the judicial
evaluation of these awards into a matter of ad hoc court discretion. It
appears that national courts can choose whatever criteria they deem
appropriate for conducting their supervision, subject to the caveat
that the criteria do not detract from the domestic arbitration rights of
the parties.
Attributing complete discretion to the requested national courts
and seeking protection from domestic provisions on arbitration can
create a "legal no-man's land"'159 and a state of chaos in transborder
practice. Ironically, the holding in Chromalloy seems to undercut the
New York Arbitration Convention by giving its underlying policy
absolute, unqualified expression. Enforcement in these circumstances
disables the governing framework. Further, it is unclear how the
parties might deal with this contingency in the arbitration agreement
because it involves the rule of law for the enforcement of awards in
foreign jurisdictions bound by a treaty regime.
K. Foreign PracticeRules
Contracting parties should be aware that national rules that
pertain to the professional activity of foreign lawyers within the
national jurisdiction could compromise their choice of legal
representation in arbitration.' 6 0 U.S. lawyers seeking to represent
parties in China or in Tokyo might not be able to participate in
arbitral proceedings that affects their clients. 16 1 The parties could

154.
Id. at 913.
155.
Id. at 914.
156. Id.
157.
Spier v. Calzaturificio Tecnica, 77 F. Supp. 2d 405, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
158.
See OTV v. Hilmarton, 1997 REV. ARB. 376 (ruling that there were no
public policy grounds to refuse enforcement of the arbitration award in another state).
159.
Scherk v. Alberto Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 517 (1974).
160.
See infra text accompanying notes 162, 173 for examples of national rules
affecting legal representation in arbitration.
161.
Id.
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endeavor to overwhelm such local practice rules in their agreement,
but it would likely be unsuccessful. Choosing a venue that is
hospitable both to arbitration and transnational legal practice may be
the best solution, although seeking to make that choice might add
another layer of difficulty to the initial negotiations.
In China, for example, according to a State Council Regulation
on Foreign Law Firms 162 that went into effect on January 1, 2002,
foreign lawyers who are part of an approved resident representative
office in China may not involve themselves in "Chinese legal
affairs.116 3 Such lawyers can engage in the rendition of only five types
of legal services:
(1)
Advising on Foreign and InternationalLaw. Registered lawyers
can give advice on the law of countries in which they are admitted to
practice. They can also provide "advice on international conventions
and international practices[.]"
(2)
Provision of Legal Representation Abroad. Upon the request of a
client or a Chinese law firm, registered lawyers can "handle [ ] legal
affairs in the countries" in which they are admitted to practice.
(3)
Secure Chinese Legal Representation for a Foreign Client.
Registered lawyers can hire a Chinese law firm on behalf of a foreign
client to provide legal representation in China on matters of Chinese
law.
(4)
Foreign lawyers in a resident representative office can also
"provide[] any legal services through a long term entrustment
agreement with a Chinese law firm;" and
(5) can "provide[ ] information relating to the impact on Chinese legal
' 16 4
environment."

Assuming that the last two categories indicate that registered
foreign lawyers can provide advice to and through a Chinese law firm
to foreign law firms, it seems clear that registered foreign lawyers are
relegated to providing legal opinions and advice primarily, if not

162.
See State Council Issues Regulation on Foreign Law Firms, INTERLINK
CHINA, available at http://www.interlinkChina.comflaws-egulations.htm (last visited
Oct. 22, 2003). The State Council Regulation consists of thirty-five articles; it is
entitled "The Regulations on the Management of Representative Offices set up by
Foreign Law Firms in China." Id. It was endorsed by the State Council on December
19, 2001. Id. Approvals under the regulation are given by the judicial administrative
department under the State Council. Id. Moreover, "Where approval is given to a
foreign law firm to establish a resident representative office, the judicial
administrative department under the State Council shall issue a practice licence to the
foreign law firm and practice certificates to its representatives." Regulations on the
Management of Representative Offices set up by Foreign Law Firms in China, ch 1.,
art. 9 (2002). The regulation itself is available at http://www.info.gov.hk/justice/new/
depart/doc/setup law firm e2.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2003) [hereinafter STATE
COUNCIL REGULATION]. On the legal profession in China, see generally Charles Chao
Liu, Note and Comment, China's Lawyer System: Dawning Upon The World Through a
Tortuous Process, 23 WHITTIER L. REV. 1038 (2002).
163.

STATE COUNCIL REGULATION, art. 15.

164.

Id.
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exclusively, upon matters of foreign and international law. They can
also facilitate the establishment of a relationship between a foreign
client and a Chinese law firm-in effect, acting as a conduit by which
Chinese law firms cultivate business. They cannot hire certified
Chinese lawyers nor have their Chinese paralegals perform legal
165
services.
The State Council Regulation is hardly an "open door" policy on
the provision of legal services in China by foreign law firms. Intended
to evidence China's admission to the WTO, it allows these firms to
engage in a restricted form of consulting. It does not appear that a
U.S. party involved in a CIETAC arbitral proceeding 166 could hire a
U.S. or other foreign law firm with a representative office in China to
provide it with legal representation before the arbitral tribunal. Such
a proceeding probably constitutes "Chinese legal affairs."'1 67 The U.S.
law firm could only secure the services of a Chinese law firm for its
client and play a role behind the scenes.
Moreover, the State Council Regulation could prevent North
American, European, or Latin American attorneys from serving as
CIETAC arbitrators. 168 The exercise of such functions can be seen as
involvement in "Chinese legal affairs."'1 6 9 While the CIETAC
Stipulations for the Appointment of Arbitrators170 appear to tolerate
and even encourage the designation of foreign arbitrators-for
example, "foreign arbitrators" are required to have "a good English
level and a certain knowledge of Chinese, however, the terms can be
softened appropriately to a small number of well known personages
in the field of international arbitration"171-the flexibility of approach
conflicts with the restrictiveness of the State Council Regulation. In
the final analysis, U.S. and other foreign parties may not be able to
choose the arbitrator they want in a CIETAC proceeding.
The State Council Regulation is circumspect, to say the least. It
will not generate a wave of boundaryless commercial law practice in
China. It is not likely to make China a more attractive venue for
international business. In fact, the regulation is likely to increase the
insecurity and uncertainty associated with foreign commercial
transactions in China.

165.
Art. 26.
See CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 2, at 1190 (discussing
166.
CIETAC Arbitration).
167.
STATE COUNCIL REGULATION, art. 15.
168.
Id.
169.
Id.
170.
Stipulations For The Appointment of Arbitrators,availableat http://www.cietacsz.org/cn/cietac/English/arbitrators/index.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2003).
171.
StipulationsFor The Appointment of Arbitrators,art. I(2)(4).
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The Japanese legal system seems to be more accepting of the
presence and activity of foreign lawyers. Despite a distrust of things
foreign and a preference for the nonadjudicatory settlement of
disputes, 172 Japan enacted a foreign lawyer law in 1986.173 Law
Number 66 of 1986, "Special Measures Law Concerning the Handling
of Legal Business by Foreign Lawyers," allowed U.S. and other
foreign lawyers to assist foreign company investment in Japan and
Japanese companies to enter the international marketplace. 174 The
law nonetheless imposed many restrictions upon the conduct of
registered foreign lawyers-for example, they could not enter into
partnerships with or hire Japanese attorneys and they could not use
the name of their home state firm-only the senior partner's name175
in their professional dealings in Japan.
The Japanese foreign lawyer law was amended in 1994, 1996,
and 1998.176 These amendments liberalized the law. For example, the
law as amended now allows a special association between Japanese
'177
lawyers and the foreign firm known as a "specific joint enterprise.
In particular, the 1996 Special Measures Law permits foreign lawyers
to act as arbitrators or represent clients in international arbitral
proceedings held in Japan. 178 According to the Japan Commercial
Arbitration Association, under Law Number 65 of June 12, 1996,
A foreign lawyer practicing outside of Japan may represent a party to
the proceedings of an arbitration case in regard to civil affairs where
the place of arbitration is located in Japan and all or part of the parties
have [a] domicile.., or principal place of business in a foreign country. A
foreign law solicitor [ ] registered in Japan... may also represent a party
in the above-mentioned case. The long pending issue of whether foreign
lawyers may represent a party in international arbitral proceedings
conducted in Japan in relation to conflicts with the Japan's [foreign]
1 79
lawyer's law is considered to have been eventually settled.

As a consequence, party selection of counsel or of an arbitrator is
more likely to be effective in Japan than China.
The lack of certainty on this question emphasizes the need for
establishing an international regulatory framework for the
transborder practice of law. It is difficult to argue with the view that
"justice should no longer be sought and found solely in local courts

172.
See CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 2, at 1187.
173.
Leonardo Ciano & Drew Martin, Japan's Foreign Lawyer Law: Disparate
Views; ALSB INT'L Bus. L.J. 101, 101, available at www.wsu.edu/~legalijrnl/cianomartin (last visited Sept. 9, 2003).
174.

Id.

175.
Id.
176.
Id.
177.
Id.
178.
Id.
179.
Foreign Lawyer's Representation in Arbitral Proceedings in Japan,
availableat www.jcaa.or.jple/arbitration (last visited Sept. 9, 2003).
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among fellow professionals with a same educational background and
subject to the same rules of ethics, but in judicial bodies which
assemble professionals with different education and training,
governed by different practice rules."'180 The multi-jurisdictional
practice rules of the EU' 8 ' provide the best example for implementing
such a system of transborder practice. With due deference paid to the
uniqueness of matters involving property and succession laws and
under the possible application of the local rules of ethics, lawyers
from Member States can engage in transactional practice and
litigation in any EU country. The regulation of the practice of law
should reflect the global character of economic activity. Sectarian
considerations should no longer prevail in the rendition of legal
services. The visibly protectionist motivation does not enhance the
public perception of lawyers or the stature of the profession. Other

180.
Carl Bevernage, Introduction-Symposium: Paris Forum on Transnational
Practicefor the Legal ProfessionDiscussion Papers, 18 DICK. J. INT'L L. 89, 92 (1999).
181.
For an exceptionally able and lucid account of the comparative value of EU
practice on this question, see Roger Goebel, The Liberalization Of Interstate Legal
Practice In The European Union: Lessons For The United States?, 34 INT'L LAW. 307
(2000).
Qualified lawyers from any Member State are now able to provide all legal
services of a transactional nature in any other European Union state (except if
the host state restricts practice in the transfer of real estate interests or in the
administration of decedents' estates), while subject to the home state ethical
rules in the execution of the transactional services. Qualified lawyers from any
Member State may also litigate in courts in any other state, subject to the host
state ethical rules, and in association with a local lawyer if the host state so
requires. It is important to note that this high degree of liberalization has
occurred without any evidence of significant functional problems or risks to
clients and without any serious opposition from national bar associationsdespite differences in substantive laws and procedural rules for greater among
the Member States than they are among the states of the United States.
Id. at 344.
[A]n exception might be recognized when out-of-state lawyers come into a state
to engage in a private arbitration proceeding. The leading arbitration bodies set
their own procedures, with which arbitration law specialists are quite familiar.
The arbitration clause in a contract frequently has a choice of law clause
designating the substantive law of a jurisdiction other than the state that is the
site of arbitration. Even when the substantive law of the state that is the site of
the arbitration governs the arbitration, there are solid policy reasons for
permitting clients to freely choose their customary counsel, who often
represented the client in the transaction that gave rise to the arbitration, or to
choose a law firm specializing in arbitration practice. In-state counsel can
always provide advice or be associated with the out-of-state lawyers if the
substantive law issues warrant this.
Id. at 343. See also Julian Lonbay, Lawyer Ethics in the Twenty-first Century: The
Global Practice Reconciling Regulatory and Deontological Differences The European
Experience, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 907, 914-18 (2001) (discussing the practical and
ethical implications of a multi-jurisdictional practice).
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than instituting the equivalent of the German "four-eyes" doctrine 182
to facilitate access to local courts, clients should have an unfettered
right to choose their lawyer-no matter the venue of the negotiations
or litigation.
Unfortunately, even in purely commercial and corporate in-house
matters, the idea of a world bar with universal standing remains a
distant vision. Until the vision becomes more of a reality, the venue
and governing law of arbitration need to be chosen with care and
deliberation. The retention of local counsel appears to be both
prudent and necessary. Nonetheless, it adds to the cost of the venture
and does not completely eliminate the fear and risks of the unknown.
Proceeding with the "tried and true" should always be the first choice.
L. The "Universal"Jurisdictionof National Courts in Transborder
Arbitration
In light of the ruling in NIOC v. Israel,8 3 there is a further
element to explore for possible inclusion in the agreement to
arbitrate. In that case, the ruling French court asserted that it had
jurisdiction in a litigation involving an oil pipeline venture between
the National Iranian Oil Company and Israel. 8 4 When a dispute
arose, the Israelis eventually (over a course of years) refused to
appoint an arbitrator because Israeli judicial rulings, rendered after
the project was instituted, made it illegal under Israeli law for the
Israeli Government to deal with Iran.1 8 5 Because the contract
authorized the ICC in Paris to resolve intractable disputes that arose
between the parties in regard to the effectuation of the arbitration,
the French court asserted that it had jurisdiction in the matter and
that, under French law, the court--once connected jurisdictionallyhad a universal juridical duty to assist transborder arbitral
tribunals. 8 6 It could, therefore, name an arbitrator on behalf of Israel
in order to promote the effective operation of the arbitration. 8 7
The
ruling
is
simultaneously
creative,
undisciplined,
transparently biased, and controversial. The practical consequence is
that a reference to ICC arbitration in an arbitration agreement raises
the prospect, under French law, of vesting French courts with
jurisdiction over a prospective arbitration. The arbitration can be as

182.
See Stephen Kabera Karanja, The Schengen Information System in Austria:
An Essential Tool in Day to Day Police and Border Control Work?, Commentary, [2002]
J. INFO. L. & TECH. 1 available at http:/elj.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/02-1/karanja.html (last
visited Sept. 9, 2003) (providing an example of the "four-eyes-entry" principle at work).
183.
Nat'l Iranian Oil Co. (NIOC) v. Etat d'Israel, 2002 REV. ARB. 427.
184.
Id.
185.
Id.
186.
Id.
187.
Id.
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unconnected to France as was the transaction and the arbitration in
NIOC v. Israel. The French court could thereby usurp the parties'
authority and its ruling could work mischief upon the arbitration and
the parties' relationship, interests, and objectives. Accordingly, any
reference to ICC arbitration should now be accompanied by a caveat
stating that the reference in no way authorizes the French courts to
rule in regard to the arbitration or that French law-either
substantive or jurisdictional-does not apply to the arbitration.
Further, the caveat could specifically disclaim that the French courts
have universal authority over arbitral proceedings. Because this type
of frontal rejection of the French judicial authority could incite the
French courts to act and eventually to nullify the contract provision,
it may be more politic to state simply that another law and courts are
authorized by contract to regulate the arbitration (perhaps to the
exclusion of all other courts, except for purposes of the enforcement of
the award). The parties could also state indirectly that the choice of
ICC arbitration does not have a bearing on any choice of law nor is it
intended to trigger the jurisdiction of any national courts except those
specifically designated in the parties' contract.
IV. CONCLUSIONS

The foregoing considerations require the parties to an arbitration
agreement to weigh a variety of factors in constructing their
agreement to arbitrate. In light of all these circumstances, the
economy and consensus embodied in the standard arbitration clause
appear more attractive than ever before. In a customized agreement,
there are an endless number of factors to assess and endless
variations on each of them. Customization requires negotiations and
greater cost at the outset of the transaction. The additional expense
and frustration could undermine the deal or compromise its
implementation. It makes the reference to arbitration potentially less
functional.
The idea of more elaborate arbitration agreements clearly is a
"godsend" to practitioners who charge an hourly fee, and they satiate
the law professor's thirst for speculative complexity. The purpose of
the exercise of freedom of contract, however, is not to thwart the
arbitral process by cluttering it with uselessly intricate provisions for
arbitration. The design of modern agreements is to stimulate the
development of a customary practice in the drafting of complex
agreements that eventually achieves economy, efficiency, and
effectiveness. Customization allows parties to anticipate risks, to
protect and secure their rights, and to exercise greater control over
the arbitral process, the arbitrators, and the arbitral procedure. The
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basic task should be to identify and elaborate upon the issues that are
imperative while maintaining the functionality of the process.
In the context of both domestic and international law, the
agreement to arbitrate can represent a means of repelling
undesirable consequences and results that have materialized in past
practice. The agreement to arbitrate also can become a law code for
the parties' arbitration. It can serve to allocate power within the
arbitration and in its aftermath. It can emphasize the necessity of
certain procedural rights and safeguards, as well as mandatory
frames of reference. In addition, the contract for arbitration can
become a code of conduct for arbitrators, establishing the perimeters
of the relationship between the arbitrators and the appointing party
and between the arbitrators themselves. The contract for arbitration
thereby allows the contracting parties to assert their control over the
process and rids their arbitration of most, if all not, of its systemic
significance. Their arbitration functions in absolute individual
isolation as a "one-off' transaction.
The privatization and contractualization of arbitration, while
they empower parties and unburden public institutions, should not
eliminate completely the basis for the public regulation of the process.
The string of "one-off' arbitrations, gathered together, has
consequences upon the public interest in the orderly administration
of adjudicative relations in both domestic and international law. The
use of arbitration does have a bearing upon the substantive content of
legal rights. Judicial vigilance should not only ward off the flagrant
abuses of process and procedure in arbitration, but it should also
establish an "interests of justice" limitation upon the operation of the
process and the rulings of arbitrators. The likelihood of exercising
this judicial power should be as clear and unequivocal as it is
restrained. It should, however, always remain meaningful. The public
interest in adjudicatory order and fairness must receive an
authoritative expression, not a perfunctory and empty nod.

